Fecha de recepción: 6 de octubre de 2025
Fecha de aceptación: 25 de febrero de 2026
Disponible en línea: 13 de mayo de 2026
Vol. 13 N.° 1
Enero - Junio del 2026
pp. 1-42
HISTORIA ECONÓMICA,EMPRESARIAL Y DEL PENSAMIENTO
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Sugerencia de citación:
Yangailo, T.
(2026). Political Regimes and
Development Outcomes: A Comparative
Analysis of One-Party, Multiparty, and
Dominant-Party Systems.
tiempo&economia, 13(1), 1-42.
https://doi.org/10.21789/24222704.2186
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21789/
24222704.2186
Political Regimes and
Development Outcomes: A
Comparative Analysis of One-
Party, Multiparty, and
Dominant-Party Systems
Regímenes políticos y resultados del
desarrollo: un análisis comparativo de
sistemas unipartidistas, multipartidistas y
de partidos dominantes
Tryson Yangailo
Independent Researcher, Zambia
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0690-9747
ytryson@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
This study examines the relationship between political regimes and
development outcomes by comparing one-party, multiparty, and
dominant-party systems in 14 countries: Angola, China, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania,
Vietnam, and Zambia. The study uses a set of economic, governance, and
health indicators to explore how regime types are associated with
variations in development performance. The findings suggest that one-
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
2
party systems tend to exhibit stronger economic performance and health
outcomes, yet they are consistently associated with weaker political
freedoms. Multiparty systems perform relatively better on governance
indicators yet display lower economic efficiency. Dominant-party systems
exhibit mixed results, characterized by institutional ambiguity, higher
corruption risks, and poorer health outcomes, despite comparatively higher
levels of foreign direct investment. Regression and ANOVA results indicate
that governance quality, particularly Government Effectiveness and
Control of Corruption, has a significant influence on Life expectancy. In
contrast, foreign direct investment shows only a modest association with
GDP growth. The study concludes that no political regime type is inherently
superior. Rather, development outcomes are shaped by institutional
capacity, policy coherence, and inclusive governance. These findings offer
policy-relevant insights for aligning governance reforms with sustainable
development objectives.
Keywords: Governance; Political Regimes; Economic Growth; Health
Outcomes; Institutional Quality; Economic History.
JEL Codes: O43, H11, I15, D72
RESUMEN
Este estudio examina la relación entre los regímenes políticos y los
resultados de desarrollo comparando sistemas unipartidistas,
multipartidistas y de partido dominante en 14 países: Angola, China, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenia, Malawi, Mozambique, Ruanda,
Tanzania, Vietnam y Zambia. El estudio utiliza un conjunto de indicadores
económicos, de gobernanza y de salud para explorar cómo los tipos de
régimen se asocian con las variaciones en el desempeño del desarrollo. Los
hallazgos sugieren que los sistemas unipartidistas tienden a mostrar un
mejor desempeño económico y resultados de salud, pero se asocian
sistemáticamente con menores libertades políticas. Los sistemas
multipartidistas tienen un desempeño relativamente mejor en los
indicadores de gobernanza, pero muestran una menor eficiencia
económica. Los sistemas de partido dominante presentan resultados
dispares, caracterizados por ambigüedad institucional, mayores riesgos de
corrupción y peores resultados en materia de salud, a pesar de tener niveles
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
3
comparativamente más altos de inversión extranjera directa. Los
resultados de regresión y ANOVA indican que la calidad de la gobernanza,
en particular la eficacia del gobierno y el control de la corrupción, influye
significativamente en la esperanza de vida. En cambio, la inversión
extranjera directa muestra una asociación modesta con el crecimiento del
PIB. El estudio concluye que ningún régimen político es inherentemente
superior. Más bien, los resultados de desarrollo se ven influenciados por la
capacidad institucional, la coherencia de las políticas y la gobernanza
inclusiva. Estos hallazgos ofrecen perspectivas relevantes para la
formulación de políticas que permiten alinear las reformas de gobernanza
alineadas con los objetivos del desarrollo sostenible.
Palabras clave: Gobernanza; Regímenes Políticos; Crecimiento
Económico; Resultados de Salud; Calidad Institucional; Historia
económica.
Códigos JEL: O43, H11, I15, D72
Introduction
Over the past few decades, many countries have embarked on
arduous journeys toward political liberalization and economic
transformation. Yet despite widespread democratization efforts, many
countries, particularly in Africa and Asia, remain plagued by governance
deficits, underdeveloped infrastructure, low human development indices,
and erratic foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. These challenges are
not isolated phenomena, but are rooted in deep-seated historical, political,
and institutional legacies that continue to shape contemporary
development trajectories. The resurgence of authoritarian governance in
various parts of the world, calls for a renewed interrogation of how political
systems interact with development outcomes across sectors.
The dual legacies of colonial authoritarianism and post-independence
autocratic rule have been identified as major impediments to Africa’s
socioeconomic progress (Darkwa, 2022). Authoritarian systems—whether
manifested through military dictatorships, dominant party regimes, or neo
patrimonial governance—often erode public institutions and centralize
power, thereby limiting the effectiveness of policy instruments aimed at
promoting inclusive development. Although countries such as Ghana under
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
4
Jerry Rawlings attempted to strike a balance between authority and
accountability, such cases remain the exception rather than the norm. This
political context complicates citizen engagement and undermines the
legitimacy and effectiveness of multiparty democratic systems, particularly
in countries where institutional checks and balances are weak or absent
(Nicholson et al., 2018; Ndikumana, 2023).
At the heart of this challenge is the issue of governance. Theories of
governance provide a framework for understanding political stability,
legality, and the suppression of corruption. According to various scholars,
social stability and economic progress are threatened by ineffective
governance; therefore, effective governance is essential for sustainable
development (Ball, 2005; Taylor, 2014). Importantly, governance
institutions do not operate in isolation; they mediate the relationship
between political regime type and development outcomes. The same
regime type can produce divergent results depending on the strength and
autonomy of its institutional framework. Numerous studies have shown
that the quality of governance—defined in terms of political stability, the
rule of law, and institutional efficiency—has a significant impact on
economic performance, infrastructure provision, and human development
outcomes (Banik et al., 2023; Levitt et al., 2010). Poor governance not only
limits the returns to public investment but also discourages private sector
participation and foreign capital inflows. Conversely, countries with robust
institutions tend to attract more sustainable and impactful FDI, improve
health outcomes, and support long-term growth (Andrijevic et al., 2020;
Fagbemi et al., 2021; Jamil Shah et al., 2019).
In particular, FDI has been highlighted as an important driver of
economic growth, facilitating access to capital, technology, and global
markets. However, its developmental impact remains uneven across
African countries. In Zambia, for example, FDI has contributed significantly
to GDP growth, but its impact on employment and national savings has
been negligible (Mukupa et al., 2016; Ndlovu & Haabazoka, 2024). This
disparity underscores the role of governance and infrastructure in shaping
the absorptive capacity of host economies. Where institutional frameworks
are weak, FDI often focuses on resource extraction with minimal linkages
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
5
to the broader economy, thereby limiting its developmental spillovers
(Claudio-Quiroga et al., 2022; Yangailo, 2024).
Human development indicators, such as health and education, are
both outcomes and enablers of economic growth. Improvements in life
expectancy through effective health spending and infrastructure
investment have been shown to contribute positively to national
productivity (Biyase & Malesa, 2019; Alwago, 2023). However, this
relationship is far from linear, and studies suggest that its effectiveness
depends on demographic structure, intergenerational transfers, and the
quality of public service delivery (Kunze, 2014; Cervellati & Sunde, 2011;
Banik et al., 2023).
Global development discourses increasingly emphasize the
interdependence between economic performance, governance quality,
and population health. In an era characterized by economic shocks, rising
inequality, and governance transitions, understanding the linkages
between these domains is essential for designing inclusive development
strategies. While economic indicators such as GDP growth, FDI, and total
reserves are often prioritized in development assessments, they do not
sufficiently account for disparities in health and institutional outcomes
across countries.
This study aims to examine the relationships between economic
indicators, governance quality, and health outcomes in a cross-country
context involving 14 diverse countries with different political systems and
development trajectories: Angola, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ghana, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Vietnam, and
Zambia. Specifically, the study evaluates how dimensions of governance—
such as Control of corruption, Voice & Accountability, and Government
Effectiveness—affect both economic growth and life expectancy, while also
assessing how different political regimes (one-party, multiparty, and
dominant party systems, including single-party systems since
independence) shape development outcomes.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
6
The significance of this study lies in its integrated, comparative, and
regime-sensitive approach. It contributes to the literature by examining the
relationship between governance, economic growth, and health
outcomes—a nexus that is often studied in isolation. Rather than asserting
direct causal effects of regime type, the study emphasizes that institutions
serve as crucial transmission mechanisms through which political
structures influence human welfare. By focusing on life expectancy as a
core governance-sensitive development outcome, the study moves beyond
purely economic metrics and assesses how political structures shape
human welfare. This multidimensional analysis provides a nuanced,
evidence-based foundation for designing context-specific governance
reforms that align with sustainable development objectives.
Literature Review
The rise of authoritarian regimes in recent years has reignited
scholarly attention to authoritarianism, particularly its typologies and
implications for governance, economic development, and social welfare
(Darkwa, 2022). Historically, Africa has experienced multiple phases of
authoritarianism, including colonial authoritarian rule, post-independence
military dictatorships, and one-party systems. These governance models,
described by Darkwa (2022) as the “twin of Africa’s woes,” have
exacerbated political and economic crises across the continent.
Authoritarian leaders have often used governance as a racket, prioritizing
personal gain over the needs of citizens. However, exceptions—such as
former Ghanaian President Jerry John Rawlings—stand out for their
relatively people-centered leadership.
Understanding the dynamics of political systems, whether
authoritarian or democratic, is essential to assessing their impact on
governance and development. Nicholson et al. (2018) emphasize that in
complex political environments, although political parties serve as essential
heuristics for the public, multiparty systems can confuse this understanding
due to ideological overlaps between parties. The complexity of this
situation was evident in Belgium, where political parties evolved into
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
7
regional entities in response to regionalization pressures (Coveil, 2023).
Similarly, in Finland, affective polarization has increased even in a low-
polarization multiparty system, driven by negative feelings toward the least
preferred parties (Kekkonen & Ylä-Anttila, 2021).
Empirical studies show significant differences between one-party and
multiparty systems in terms of both governance and economic
performance. Multiparty systems often perform better on governance
indicators such as the Rule of Law and Voice & Accountability (Bowler et al.,
2023; Ndikumana, 2023). However, one-party regimes can achieve short-
term economic gains, as evidenced by higher reserves, FDI inflows, and
GDP growth (Yangailo, 2025). Although Ndikumana (2023) found strong
support for multiparty systems in Burundi, notable gender differences in
preferences underscored the importance of the context in regime support.
The quality of governance significantly affects health and economic
development. Although Banik et al. (2023) show that the effectiveness of
health spending depends on political stability and governance quality,
Fagbemi et al. (2021) argue that poor governance in sub-Saharan Africa is a
direct cause of low socioeconomic conditions. Similarly, Rizvi (2022)
emphasizes the role of institutional reform in promoting stability and
development. Governance challenges also affect infrastructure
development, as Levitt et al. (2010) show, suggesting that alternative
financing and governance models could improve project sustainability.
Even though economic performance is closely linked to FDI, its impact
varies across regions and institutional settings. Mukupa et al. (2016) found
that FDI significantly boosted Zambia’s economic performance, while
Ndlovu & Haabazoka (2024) found that it had minimal effects on savings
and employment. Regional studies confirm a positive but uneven impact of
FDI, depending on infrastructure, human capital, and governance
(Zekarias, 2016; Claudio-Quiroga et al., 2022; Yangailo, 2024). Thus,
enabling environment and tailored policies are critical to maximizing the
benefits of FDI.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
8
Life expectancy, a key health outcome, is shaped by both economic
and governance factors. Kunze (2014) and Cervellati & Sunde (2011) show
how life expectancy interacts with demographic change and human capital
accumulation. Ngangue & Manfred (2015), He & Li (2020), and Shahbaz et
al. (2019) all show that life expectancy and GDP are positively related,
although the strength of this relationship varies across country income
levels and aging demographics. Biyase & Malesa (2019) find similar patterns
in Southern Africa, while Alwago (2023) identifies health spending and life
expectancy as drivers of GDP growth in Kenya.
Capital formation remains fundamental to economic development.
Apergis & Payne (2010) find long-term equilibrium between capital
investment and economic growth, and Baz et al. (2021) suggest that capital
directed toward clean technologies promotes both economic and
environmental sustainability. Research on regional disparities supports this
finding, with East Asia’s rapid growth linked to FDI and innovation, in
contrast to sub-Saharan Africa’s stagnation due to weak institutions and
overreliance on aid (Yangailo, 2024).
Gaps in Literature
The existing literature supports the notion that economic growth
alone is insufficient to ensure sustained improvements in human
development outcomes. Scholars such as Claudio-Quiroga et al. (2022) and
Biyase & Malesa (2019) emphasize the importance of the quality of
governance and institutional robustness in shaping development
trajectories. For example, Fagbemi et al. (2021) find that countries with
stronger institutions not only attract more FDI, but also more effectively
translate economic gains into broader welfare outcomes. Similarly,
Ndikumana (2023) argues that democratic reforms alone are insufficient
without concurrent improvements in institutional accountability,
administrative capacity, and transparency.
Studies by Banik et al. (2023) and Nicholson et al. (2018) further
suggest that governance plays a critical mediating role in determining
whether economic progress translates into tangible social outcomes.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
9
However, much of the existing literature tends to focus on single-country
case studies or regional assessments, often neglecting comparative
regime-based analyses and omitting health indicators from their evaluation
frameworks. Despite these scholarly contributions, important gaps remain
in the literature. First, few studies simultaneously examine the triadic
relationship between governance, economic growth, and health outcomes
in a broad, cross-national context that includes both developing and
emerging economies. Second, little empirical attention has been paid to
how different regime types—namely, one-party, multiparty, and dominant
party systems—affect these relationships, particularly in terms of
institutional performance and development efficiency. Third, despite being
a core component of the Human Development Index (HDI) and a proxy for
public service delivery, life expectancy remains understudied as a
governance-sensitive development outcome.
This study addresses these gaps by providing a comparative, multi-
country analysis that integrates economic, governance, and health
indicators. Using recent data and robust statistical models—including linear
regression and ANOVA—the study assesses how political regime types
shape development outcomes across governance dimensions. In doing so,
it provides a nuanced, evidence-based framework for integrating
governance reforms into sustainable development strategies, highlighting
the need for context-specific policy approaches tailored to regime structure
and institutional capacity.
Methodology
This study uses a comparative cross-country research design to
examine the interplay between economic performance, governance
quality, and health outcomes in fourteen countries—Tanzania, Zambia,
Mozambique, Malawi, Angola, Ghana, Vietnam, Indonesia, Rwanda,
Kenya, China, India, Cuba, and Costa Rica—over the period 1991 to 2023.
All data are drawn from the World Bank’s publicly available databases to
ensure consistency and comparability across countries and over time. Key
variables include total reserves (current US$), net FDI inflows (percent of
GDP), life expectancy at birth (years), three governance indicators (Voice &
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
10
Accountability, Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, and Rule
of Law, each expressed as percentile ranks), GDP (current US$), and annual
GDP growth (percent).
Data extraction and preliminary cleaning were performed to align
country names, convert annual figures into panel format, and address
sporadic missing values through listwise deletion where omissions did not
exceed 5 percent of observations. All subsequent analyses were conducted
in Jamovi using its built-in modules for descriptive statistics, correlation,
regression, and analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Descriptive statistics were first generated to profile each country’s
trajectory along economic, health, and governance dimensions. Pearson
correlation coefficients were then computed to examine bivariate
relationships among reserves, FDI, governance ranks, and life expectancy.
To assess multivariate dynamics, two ordinary least squares regression
models were estimated. The first model treated annual GDP growth as the
dependent variable regressed on FDI inflows, total reserves, and GDP size.
The second model examined life expectancy as the outcome variable, with
governance indicators and economic covariates as predictors. All models
report adjusted R² values, standardized beta coefficients, and two-tailed
significance tests at the 5 percent level.
To compare regime-specific performance, countries were categorized
into three political system groups: (1) one-party states (China, Cuba,
Vietnam); (2) dominant-party systems (Angola, Tanzania, Mozambique,
Rwanda); and (3) competitive multiparty democracies (Costa Rica, Ghana,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia). A one-way ANOVA was
conducted to test for mean differences in reserves, FDI, governance scores,
GDP growth, and life expectancy across these groups. Given violations of
homogeneity-of-variances detected by Levene’s test, the Games-Howell
post hoc procedure was applied to identify which pairs of regime types
differed significantly without assuming equal variances or sample sizes.
By combining long-run data from 1991 to 2023 with robust statistical
techniques implemented in Jamovi, this methodology provides a rigorous
foundation for understanding how different political regimes shape
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
11
Table 1
. Descriptive statistics for a range of variables across several countries
Country
Mean
Median
Mode
SD
Total reserves (includes gold, current US$)
Angola
1.06e+10
1.12e+10
0.00000
1.05e+10
China
1.74e+12
1.55e+12
2.49e+10
ᵃ
1.52e+12
Costa Rica
4.27e0+9
3.80e0+9
9.06e0+8
ᵃ
3.25e0+9
Cuba
0.000
0.000
0.00000
0.000
Ghana
3.32e0+9
2.22e0+9
3.09e0+8
ᵃ
2.80e0+9
India
2.32e+11
2.57e+11
7.62e0+9
ᵃ
1.99e+11
Indonesia
6.85e+10
5.16e+10
1.04e+10
ᵃ
4.86e+10
Kenya
3.84e0+9
2.88e0+9
7.95e0+7
ᵃ
3.24e0+9
Malawi
2.80e0+8
2.17e0+8
0.00000
2.42e0+8
economic resilience, governance effectiveness, and population health over
more than three decades.
Results
Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for a number of variables across
several countries, including total reserves (including gold, in current US$),
FDI as a percentage of GDP, life expectancy at birth, and various
governance indicators such as Voice and Accountability, Control of
Corruption, Government Effectiveness, and Rule of Law. Each of these
statistics is provided for countries such as Angola, China, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania,
Vietnam, and Zambia.
Table 1 shows considerable variation across countries. For example,
total reserves for China are remarkably high, averaging about $1.74 trillion,
whereas countries such as Cuba and Malawi report much lower reserves,
with Cuba reporting zero reserves. Life expectancy at birth varies similarly,
with Costa Rica having a high mean of 78.54 years, while Angola and
Mozambique have lower means of around 54 years, reflecting disparities in
health care and living standards.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
12
Table 1
. Descriptive statistics for a range of variables across several countries
Country
Mean
Median
Mode
SD
Mozambique
1.79e0+9
1.52e0+9
1.78e0+8
ᵃ
1.30e0+9
Rwanda
6.68e0+8
4.75e0+8
4.74e0+7
ᵃ
5.83e0+8
Tanzania
1.99e0+9
1.55e0+9
0.00000
1.82e0+9
Viet Nam
2.62e+10
1.34e+10
0.00000
3.20e+10
Zambia
1.28e0+9
1.09e0+9
0.00000
ᵃ
1.13e0+9
Foreign direct investment: net inflows (% of
GDP)
Angola
3.761
2.399
-10.03838
ᵃ
10.375
China
3.179
3.484
0.24011
ᵃ
1.459
Costa Rica
4.924
4.829
2.47238
ᵃ
1.580
Cuba
0.000
0.000
0.00000
0.000
Ghana
3.876
3.158
0.30288
ᵃ
2.665
India
1.288
1.313
0.02723
ᵃ
0.813
Indonesia
1.304
1.788
-2.75744
ᵃ
1.338
Kenya
0.776
0.468
-0.00537
ᵃ
0.809
Malawi
1.564
1.025
-0.89498
ᵃ
1.819
Mozambique
11.627
5.991
0.58368
ᵃ
11.392
Rwanda
1.509
1.500
1.33e0-4
ᵃ
1.325
Tanzania
2.518
2.093
1.39e0-4
ᵃ
1.451
Viet Nam
5.498
4.803
3.39040
ᵃ
2.151
Zambia
4.395
4.533
-0.22329
ᵃ
2.617
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
Angola
53.807
54.200
42.19000
ᵃ
7.528
China
74.297
74.789
68.61000
ᵃ
3.002
Costa Rica
78.540
79.049
76.23700
ᵃ
1.499
Cuba
76.547
77.406
73.20100
ᵃ
1.560
Ghana
60.427
60.282
55.72200
ᵃ
3.041
India
65.596
65.803
59.03200
ᵃ
3.909
Indonesia
67.586
67.664
63.70300
ᵃ
2.008
Kenya
59.360
59.407
55.47800
ᵃ
2.796
Malawi
54.324
54.687
43.54000
ᵃ
8.488
Mozambique
53.683
53.255
44.70500
ᵃ
5.726
Rwanda
55.609
59.504
12.15800
ᵃ
12.163
Tanzania
58.691
59.260
51.00500
ᵃ
5.798
Viet Nam
72.959
73.385
69.30300
ᵃ
1.503
Zambia
54.145
53.730
45.70900
ᵃ
6.977
Voice & Accountability: Percentile Rank
Angola
12.327
14.423
0.00000
8.720
China
5.073
5.419
0.00000
3.349
Costa Rica
61.737
81.221
0.00000
35.611
Cuba
5.060
4.975
0.00000
4.043
Ghana
45.018
58.654
0.00000
26.413
India
44.666
59.204
0.00000
25.880
Indonesia
35.123
46.635
0.00000
21.687
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
13
Table 1
. Descriptive statistics for a range of variables across several countries
Country
Mean
Median
Mode
SD
Kenya
28.269
36.493
0.00000
16.993
Malawi
32.309
40.758
0.00000
19.241
Mozambique
30.368
37.931
0.00000
18.253
Rwanda
10.717
11.848
0.00000
7.504
Tanzania
28.125
33.495
0.00000
16.734
Viet Nam
7.758
8.654
0.00000
4.903
Zambia
29.661
36.453
0.00000
17.361
Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank
Angola
7.244
4.762
0.00000
8.314
China
32.818
37.073
0.00000
19.895
Costa Rica
53.916
70.616
0.00000
31.132
Cuba
46.288
60.000
0.00000
26.946
Ghana
39.123
50.000
0.00000
22.801
India
32.000
40.741
0.00000
18.675
Indonesia
21.253
21.905
0.00000
14.994
Kenya
13.243
15.789
0.00000
8.515
Malawi
25.362
27.317
0.00000
16.588
Mozambique
23.732
24.762
0.00000
15.281
Rwanda
43.636
57.282
0.00000
29.092
Tanzania
26.289
29.570
0.00000
16.379
Viet Nam
26.894
32.857
0.00000
16.198
Zambia
26.675
31.034
0.00000
16.531
Government Effectiveness: Percentile Rank
Angola
9.956
11.905
0.00000
6.681
China
45.924
56.585
0.00000
27.430
Costa Rica
47.559
61.429
0.00000
27.481
Cuba
32.013
42.105
0.00000
19.419
Ghana
36.997
45.771
0.00000
21.699
India
42.174
53.171
0.00000
24.696
Indonesia
35.730
43.602
0.00000
22.939
Kenya
26.281
33.649
0.00000
15.448
Malawi
22.086
21.905
0.00000
14.955
Mozambique
22.186
25.000
0.00000
14.955
Rwanda
32.588
47.573
0.00000
24.891
Tanzania
23.853
28.910
0.00000
14.658
Viet Nam
37.130
45.933
0.00000
22.097
Zambia
17.651
19.048
0.00000
11.783
Rule of Law: Percentile Rank
Angola
7.519
7.212
0.00000
6.102
China
30.678
36.000
0.00000
18.592
Costa Rica
49.816
64.623
0.00000
28.728
Cuba
20.873
26.316
0.00000
14.445
Ghana
40.038
52.239
0.00000
23.380
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
14
Table 1
. Descriptive statistics for a range of variables across several countries
Country
Mean
Median
Mode
SD
India
41.853
53.333
0.00000
24.195
Indonesia
26.434
30.806
0.00000
16.418
Kenya
20.393
19.900
0.00000
14.059
Malawi
33.997
43.810
0.00000
20.053
Mozambique
18.780
20.476
0.00000
12.779
Rwanda
30.286
35.407
0.00000
23.766
Tanzania
29.497
37.089
0.00000
17.460
Viet Nam
31.642
37.799
0.00000
19.259
Zambia
29.114
36.364
0.00000
17.307
GDP (current US$)
Angola
5.19e+10
5.24e+10
4.44e0+9
ᵃ
4.27e+10
China
6.23e+12
3.55e+12
3.83e+11
ᵃ
5.98e+12
Costa Rica
3.43e+10
2.69e+10
7.22e0+9
ᵃ
2.30e+10
Cuba
4.87e+10
3.82e+10
0.00000
3.11e+10
Ghana
3.14e+10
2.48e+10
4.98e0+9
ᵃ
2.68e+10
India
1.40e+12
1.20e+12
2.70e+11
ᵃ
1.05e+12
Indonesia
5.72e+11
4.32e+11
9.54e+10
ᵃ
4.18e+11
Kenya
4.38e+10
3.20e+10
5.75e0+9
ᵃ
3.64e+10
Malawi
6.75e0+9
6.45e0+9
1.72e0+9
ᵃ
3.59e0+9
Mozambique
1.04e+10
1.08e+10
2.80e0+9
ᵃ
5.48e0+9
Rwanda
5.42e0+9
4.07e0+9
7.54e0+8
ᵃ
3.89e0+9
Tanzania
3.12e+10
2.19e+10
6.18e0+9
ᵃ
2.28e+10
Viet Nam
1.43e+11
7.74e+10
9.61e0+9
ᵃ
1.35e+11
Zambia
1.40e+10
1.41e+10
3.18e0+9
ᵃ
9.82e0+9
GDP growth (annual %)
Angola
3.778
3.055
-23.98342
ᵃ
7.620
China
8.946
9.134
2.23864
ᵃ
2.838
Costa Rica
4.224
4.215
-4.27335
ᵃ
2.543
Cuba
1.521
2.390
-14.87818
ᵃ
5.951
Ghana
5.244
4.700
0.51394
ᵃ
2.481
India
6.073
6.795
-5.77772
ᵃ
2.881
Indonesia
4.638
5.070
-13.12673
ᵃ
3.695
Kenya
3.699
4.147
-0.79949
ᵃ
2.336
Malawi
3.966
4.354
-10.24018
ᵃ
4.907
Mozambique
6.197
6.680
-7.57665
ᵃ
4.175
Rwanda
6.024
8.158
-50.24807
ᵃ
12.125
Tanzania
5.099
5.468
0.58432
ᵃ
1.943
Viet Nam
6.663
6.787
2.55373
ᵃ
1.563
Zambia
4.385
5.058
-8.62544
ᵃ
3.801
ᵃ More than one mode exists, only the first is reported
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
15
Table 1 also shows differences in governance indicators. Costa Rica
and Rwanda perform relatively well in terms of Voice & Accountability, with
Costa Rica having an average percentile rank of 61.74, while Angola and
Vietnam have significantly lower rankings. This reflects differences in the
level of political freedom and public participation between countries.
Control of Corruption shows a similar pattern, with Costa Rica, Cuba and
Rwanda performing better than Angola and China. Similarly, government
effectiveness is relatively higher in countries such as Costa Rica and India
than in Zambia or Malawi, as reflected in the Government Effectiveness
percentile rank.
In terms of economic performance, GDP growth rates show a range of
experiences across countries. While China enjoys a high average growth
rate of 8.95 percent, other countries, such as Cuba and Rwanda, report
negative growth figures at times. This suggests that these countries may
face significant economic challenges or have more volatile economies. FDI
inflows as a percentage of GDP are highest in Mozambique (11.63 percent)
and lowest in Cuba and Malawi, demonstrating the different levels of
foreign investment in these countries. Overall, Table 1 show significant
differences in economic, health, and governance indicators among the
countries included in the study.
Correlation Analysis
The correlation matrix in Table 2 explores the relationships between
several key economic and governance variables across the dataset. The
Pearson correlation coefficients (r) reflect the strength and direction of the
linear relationships between pairs of variables, along with their associated
p-values indicating statistical significance.
Economic Variables
Total reserves (including gold, current US$) show strong positive
correlations with several variables. For example, it is highly positively
correlated with GDP (current US$) (r = 0.947, p < .001), which is not
surprising since both indicators are related to a country’s financial capacity.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
16
However, it shows a weak negative correlation with FDI inflows as a
percentage of GDP (r = -0.048, p = 0.307), which is not statistically
significant. This suggests that countries with higher reserves do not
necessarily attract more FDI.
Life expectancy at birth (total years) has a moderate positive
correlation with total reserves (r = 0.287, p < .001) and GDP (current US$) (r
= 0.292, p < .001), indicating that wealthier nations and those with larger
reserves tend to have higher life expectancies. It also shows a strong
positive correlation with Control of Corruption (r = 0.501, p < .001) and
Government Effectiveness (r = 0.555, p < .001), suggesting that better
governance practices are associated with better population health
outcomes.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
17
Table 2
. Correlation Matrix for a range of variables across several countries
Total
reserves
(include
s gold,
current
US$)
Foreign
direct
investme
nt, net
inflows
(% of
GDP)
Life
expectan
cy at
birth,
total
(years)
Voice &
Accountabili
ty:
Percentile
Rank
Control
of
Corruptio
n:
Percentil
e Rank
Governme
nt
Effectivene
ss:
Percentile
Rank
Rule of
Law:
Percenti
le Rank
GDP
(curre
nt
US$)
GDP
growt
h
(annu
al %)
Total
reserves
(includes
gold,
current
US$)
Pearson
’s r
—
df
—
p-value
—
Foreign
direct
investment,
net inflows
(% of GDP)
Pearson
’s r
-
0.04
8
—
df
460
—
p-value
0.30
7
—
Life
expectancy
at birth,
total (years)
Pearson
’s r
0.28
7
**
*
-0.060
—
df
460
460
—
p-value
< .00
1
0.195
—
Voice &
Accountabili
ty:
Percentile
Rank
Pearson
’s r
-
0.13
7
**
0.125
**
0.184
**
*
—
df
460
460
460
—
p-value
0.00
3
0.007
< .00
1
—
Control of
Corruption:
Percentile
Rank
Pearson
’s r
0.14
4
**
0.045
0.501
**
*
0.583
***
—
df
460
460
460
460
—
p-value
0.00
2
0.330
< .00
1
< .001
—
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
18
Government
Effectiveness:
Percentile
Rank
Pearson
’s r
0.34
4
**
*
0.015
0.555
**
*
0.602
***
0.857
**
*
—
df
460
460
460
460
460
—
p-value
< .00
1
0.753
< .00
1
< .001
< .00
1
—
Rule of Law:
Percentile
Rank
Pearson
’s r
0.16
3
**
*
0.047
0.429
**
*
0.771
***
0.853
**
*
0.885
***
—
df
460
460
460
460
460
460
—
p-value
< .00
1
0.313
< .00
1
< .001
< .00
1
< .001
—
GDP
(current
US$)
Pearson
’s r
0.94
7
**
*
-0.065
0.292
**
*
-0.104
*
0.156
**
*
0.358
***
0.18
4
**
*
—
df
460
460
460
460
460
460
460
—
p-value
< .00
1
0.166
< .00
1
0.026
< .00
1
< .001
< .00
1
—
GDP growth
(annual %)
Pearson
’s r
0.10
4
*
0.104
*
0.107
*
0.032
0.105
*
0.136
**
0.10
1
*
0.084
—
df
460
460
460
460
460
460
460
460
—
p-value
0.02
6
0.025
0.021
0.496
0.024
0.004
0.03
0
0.073
—
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Governance Variables
Voice & Accountability shows positive correlations with life expectancy
(r = 0.184, p < .001) and GDP growth (r = 0.136, p < .01). This suggests that
more democratic and accountable governance systems tend to correlate
with better health outcomes and more stable economic performance,
although these relationships are not as strong as those between Government
Effectiveness and Control of Corruption.
Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness show very strong
positive correlations with each other (r = 0.583, p < .001), reinforcing the idea
that less corrupt governments are also more effective at implementing
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
19
policies that improve national outcomes such as economic growth and public
health.
The Rule of Law also shows very strong positive correlations with other
governance indicators, particularly Government Effectiveness (r = 0.853, p <
.001) and Control of Corruption (r = 0.771, p < .001). This suggests that
countries with strong legal systems tend to perform well on other
dimensions of governance, contributing to better economic and social
outcomes.
GDP and Economic Growth
As expected, GDP (current US$) is highly correlated with several
variables, most notably total reserves (r = 0.947, p < .001) and life expectancy
at birth (r = 0.292, p < .001). These correlations reflect the economic growth
and resources that often coincide with longer life spans in wealthier
countries.
GDP growth (annual %) shows several significant correlations with the
other variables, most notably with total reserves (r = 0.104, p = 0.026) and
FDI inflows (r = 0.104, p = 0.025). These correlations suggest that economic
growth is associated with reserve accumulation and foreign investment.
Regression Analysis
Regression analysis on GDP growth
As Tables 3 shows, the linear regression model examining the predictors
of GDP growth (annual %) indicates an overall weak fit. The multiple
correlation coefficient (R = 0.206) indicates a weak linear relationship
between the predictors and GDP growth. The R² value of 0.0422 suggests
that only about 4.22% of the variance in GDP growth is explained by the
model, while the adjusted R² (0.0232)—which penalizes for the number of
predictors—further confirms the limited explanatory power of the model.
Nevertheless, the F-test (F = 2.22, p = 0.020) is statistically significant,
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
20
indicating that the model as a whole has some predictive utility, although the
effect size is small.
Table 3. Model Fit Measures
As shown in Table 4, the intercept (0.9023, p = 0.670) is not statistically
significant, meaning that when all predictors are zero, GDP growth is not
significantly different from zero. FDI has a positive and significant effect
(estimate = 0.1058, p = 0.032), indicating that a 1% increase in FDI inflows (as
a % of GDP) is associated with a 0.106% increase in GDP growth, holding
other factors constant. Total reserves (p = 0.489), life expectancy (p = 0.200),
and governance indicators (Voice & Accountability, Control of Corruption,
Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law) are not statistically significant,
meaning that they do not strongly predict GDP growth in this model.
Political system groupings (one-party vs. multiparty, dominant party vs.
multiparty) also show no significant differences in GDP growth (p = 0.776 and
p = 0.177, respectively).
Table 4. Model Coefficients - GDP growth (annual %)
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
21
Regression Analysis on Life Expectancy at Birth
As shown in Table 5, the regression model for life expectancy at birth
(total years) shows a good fit. The multiple correlation coefficient (R = 0.785)
indicates a high linear relationship between the predictors and life
expectancy. The R² value of 0.616 means that 61.6% of the variance in life
expectancy is explained by the model, while the adjusted R² (0.608) remains
high, confirming that the predictors together have substantial explanatory
power. The F-test (F = 80.4, p < .001) is highly significant, indicating that the
model as a whole is a strong predictor of life expectancy.
Table 5. Model Fit Measures
The intercept (54.8175, p < .001) as shown in Table 6 is highly significant,
indicating that the baseline life expectancy (when all predictors are zero) is
approximately 54.82 years. Voice & Accountability (estimate = 0.1362, p <
.001) and Control of Corruption (estimate = 0.1021, p < .001) have strong
positive effects on life expectancy. A 1 percentile rank increase in these
governance measures is associated with an increase in life expectancy of
0.136 and 0.102 years, respectively.
Government Effectiveness (estimate = 0.1037, p = 0.007) also has a
positive and significant effect, although it is slightly weaker. The Rule of Law
(estimate = -0.1141, p = 0.009) has a negative and significant effect, which is
unexpected. This could mean that in some contexts stricter law enforcement
does not necessarily improve life expectancy.
Total reserves (p = 0.803) and FDI (% of GDP, p = 0.134) are not
significant, suggesting that they do not strongly influence life expectancy in
this model. GDP growth (p = 0.200) is also insignificant, indicating that short-
term economic growth does not directly predict life expectancy.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
22
One-party (vs. multiparty) systems show a large positive effect
(estimate = 14.2878, p < .001), meaning that life expectancy is 14.29 years
higher in one-party systems than in multiparty systems, holding other
factors constant. This could reflect differences in health care investment,
stability, or policy continuity in such regimes.
Dominant party systems (vs. multiparty) have a negative effect
(estimate = -4.5138, p < .001), indicating that life expectancy is 4.51 years
lower in dominant party systems compared to multiparty systems. This may
suggest that hybrid systems (neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic)
perform worse in terms of health outcomes.
Table 6. Model Coefficients - Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
ANOVA
The Welch’s ANOVA results in Table 7 show significant differences
between multiparty, one-party, and single-party political systems for most
of the variables examined. In particular, life expectancy (F = 411.27, p < .001)
and Voice & Accountability (F = 213.55, p < .001) show the greatest variation,
suggesting that political systems have a profound effect on health outcomes
and democratic freedoms. Economic measures such as total reserves (F =
27.58, p < .001) and GDP (F = 31.92, p < .001) also differ significantly, while
GDP growth (F = 2.29, p = 0.104) shows no meaningful variation, suggesting
that short-term economic performance is less related to regime type.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
23
Table 7. One-Way ANOVA (Welch’s)
Table 8 reveal stark contrasts among political systems. One-party
regimes exhibit the greatest economic capacity, with average total reserves
of $589 billion, far exceeding those of multiparty systems ($44.8 billion) and
dominant party systems ($3.76 billion). Similarly, one-party systems have
the highest levels of GDP, averaging $2.14 trillion, reinforcing their economic
dominance. However, dominant party systems attract the highest levels of
FDI at 4.85 percent of GDP, possibly due to selective market liberalization
despite weaker governance structures. In contrast, multiparty systems
occupy a middle ground economically but tend to perform better on
democratic indicators.
The most striking finding is the difference in life expectancy between
political systems. One-party states have an average life expectancy of 74.6
years, significantly higher than multiparty (62.85 years) and dominant party
systems (55.45 years). This suggests that centralized governance may
improve public health outcomes, while dominant party systems—often
hybrid regimes—struggle with health outcomes. Governance indicators
further differentiate these systems: multiparty regimes score highest in
Voice & Accountability (39.54 percentile), while one-party systems suppress
political freedoms (5.96 percentile). Interestingly, one-party systems also
outperform others in Government Effectiveness (38.36 percentile),
suggesting that autocratic efficiency may come at the expense of civil
liberties.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
24
Table 8.
Group Descriptives
Group
N
Mean
SD
SE
Total reserves (includes gold, current US$)
Multiparty
231
4.48e+10
1.11e+11
7.29e0+9
One-Party
99
5.89e+11
1.19e+12
1.20e+11
Dominant-Party
Systems
132
3.76e0+9
6.65e0+9
5.79e0+8
Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (%
of GDP)
Multiparty
231
2.59
2.40
0.158
One-Party
99
2.89
2.71
0.272
Dominant-Party
Systems
132
4.85
8.66
0.754
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)
Multiparty
231
62.85
9.26
0.609
One-Party
99
74.60
2.59
0.260
Dominant-Party
Systems
132
55.45
8.39
0.730
Voice & Accountability: Percentile Rank
Multiparty
231
39.54
26.21
1.725
One-Party
99
5.96
4.30
0.432
Dominant-Party
Systems
132
20.38
16.19
1.409
Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank
Multiparty
231
30.22
22.89
1.506
One-Party
99
35.33
22.77
2.289
Dominant-Party
Systems
132
25.23
22.67
1.973
Government Effectiveness: Percentile
Rank
Multiparty
231
32.64
22.70
1.494
One-Party
99
38.36
23.70
2.382
Dominant-Party
Systems
132
22.15
18.30
1.593
Rule of Law: Percentile Rank
Multiparty
231
34.52
22.87
1.504
One-Party
99
27.73
18.06
1.815
Dominant-Party
Systems
132
21.52
18.66
1.624
GDP (current US$)
Multiparty
231
3.00e+11
6.43e+11
4.23e+10
One-Party
99
2.14e+12
4.49e+12
4.51e+11
Dominant-Party
Systems
132
2.47e+10
3.04e+10
2.65e0+9
GDP growth (annual %)
Multiparty
231
4.60
3.39
0.223
One-Party
99
5.71
4.97
0.500
Dominant-Party
Systems
132
5.27
7.50
0.653
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
25
Assumption Checks
Table 9. Normality Test (Shapiro-Wilk)
Normality tests in Table 9 confirm that all variables violate the
normality assumption (p < .001), justifying the use of Welch’s ANOVA. In
addition, Levene's test in Table 10 indicates heteroscedasticity for most
variables (p < .001), with the exception of Control of Corruption (p =
0.819).
Table 10. Homogeneity of Variances Test (Levene’s)
In this scenario, the choice between Tukey’s and Games-Howell’s
post hoc tests depends on the results of the assumption checks,
particularly with respect to violations of normality and homogeneity of
variances. Tukey’s test is usually used when the normality assumption is
met and the homogeneity of variances assumption is not violated.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
26
However, since Levene’s test shows violations of homogeneity of
variances for most variables, Tukey’s test may not be the most
appropriate choice because it assumes equal variances across groups
and its results may not be reliable if this assumption is violated. On the
other hand, the Games-Howell test is preferred when the homogeneity
of variances assumption is violated and the normality assumption may
not be strictly met. Since Levene’s test indicates unequal variances for
several variables and the Shapiro-Wilk test indicates violations of
normality, the Games-Howell test is the better option in this case. It is
more robust to both unequal variances and non-normality, making it
suitable for this scenario. Therefore, given the assumption violations,
Games-Howell should be used for post hoc comparisons as it is better
equipped to handle these violations.
Games-Howell Post-Hoc Test
Table 11 shows that one-party systems exhibit overwhelming
economic dominance on key indicators. Their average reserves exceed
those of multiparty systems by approximately $544 billion (p < 0.001),
and their GDP exceeds that of multiparty systems by $1.84 trillion (p <
0.001). Dominant party systems consistently rank lowest in both
reserves and GDP, highlighting their relatively weak economic position
compared to the other political systems.
FDI shows a clear pattern across political systems. Dominant party
systems attract significantly more FDI than both multiparty systems
(2.26% more, p = 0.011) and one-party systems (1.96% more, p = 0.041).
However, there is no significant difference in FDI inflows between one-
party and multiparty systems (p = 0.602). This trend suggests that one-
party regimes may take advantage of selective market liberalization or
other investment incentives despite generally weaker governance
frameworks.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
27
Table 11. Games-Howell Post-Hoc Test Results Across All Variables
Life expectancy data reveal stark differences between political
regimes. Citizens in one-party systems live on average 11.7 years longer
than those in multiparty systems (p < 0.001) and 19.15 years longer than
those in dominant-party systems (p < 0.001). Even between multiparty
and dominant party systems, the difference is substantial, with
multiparty systems outperforming by 7.41 years (p < 0.001). These
results suggest that health system efficiency and public health
outcomes vary significantly by political structure.
Governance measures underscore the strengths of multiparty
systems in promoting democratic accountability. On the Voice &
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
28
Accountability Index, multiparty systems outperform one-party systems
by 33.6 points and dominant-party systems by 19.2 points (both p <
0.001). Dominant party systems score significantly lower on
Government Effectiveness than both one-party and multiparty systems
(p < 0.001).
For Rule of Law, multiparty systems again take the lead,
outperforming both other systems at the 5% significance level.
However, for Control of Corruption, the only significant difference is
between one-party and dominant party systems (p = 0.003), with
multiparty systems showing no significant advantage in this dimension.
Interestingly, GDP growth rates do not differ significantly across
political systems, with all comparisons yielding p-values greater than
0.05. In addition, some governance indicators show only marginal or
insignificant differences across systems, suggesting that certain
dimensions of institutional quality may not be closely linked to political
structure.
In a nutshell, each political system has distinct advantages and
limitations. One-party regimes dominate in economic indicators and
health outcomes but do so with significant restrictions on political
freedoms. Multiparty systems offer a more balanced profile, combining
moderate economic performance with strong governance and
democratic accountability. In contrast, one-party systems generally
underperform on most measures, despite their surprising ability to
attract higher levels of FDI.
Discussion
This study examines economic, health, and governance indicators
in a diverse group of countries—Angola, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ghana,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania,
Vietnam, and Zambia—and finds patterns both consistent with and
divergent from existing academic literature. The results reveal
significant cross-country variation, reflecting the complex
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
29
interdependence among economic performance, governance quality,
and health outcomes.
Descriptive statistics revealed marked differences in economic
indicators. China led the way with an average of $1.74 trillion in total
reserves, in sharp contrast to Cuba, which reported zero reserves, and
Malawi, which held only $280 million, indicating wide variations in
macroeconomic stability. Mozambique recorded the highest FDI inflows
at 11.63% of GDP, while both Cuba and Malawi attracted minimal
foreign investment. These patterns support Yangailo’s (2024)
observation that FDI tends to be concentrated in resource-rich
economies, although its developmental impact is often limited in
countries with weak institutional frameworks.
Regression results on GDP growth yielded a model with low
explanatory power (adjusted R² = 0.0232, p = 0.020), identifying FDI as
the only statistically significant predictor (β = 0.106, p = 0.032). This
suggests that while FDI makes a modest contribution to growth, other
unaccounted factors—such as the domestic policy environment and
global economic dynamics—play a more dominant role. These findings
echo the conclusions of Ndlovu & Haabazoka (2024), who argue that the
growth effects of FDI are limited in the absence of strong institutional
support.
Health outcomes varied considerably across the sample. Costa Rica
had the highest life expectancy (78.54 years), while Angola and
Mozambique had the lowest (around 54 years). The regression model for
life expectancy had substantial explanatory power (adjusted R² = 0.608,
p < 0.001), with Government Effectiveness (β = 0.104, p = 0.007), and
Control of Corruption (β = 0.102, p < 0.001) emerging as significant
predictors. These findings provide empirical support for Biyase & Malesa
(2019), who highlighted the role of good governance in translating
economic gains into improved health outcomes.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
30
Interestingly, political regime type was a significant determinant of
life expectancy. One-party states had significantly higher life
expectancy (+14.29 years, p < 0.001) compared to multiparty systems,
while dominant party regimes underperformed (-4.51 years, p < 0.001).
These results suggest that centralized government structures may
facilitate more effective healthcare, but this interpretation requires
caution. Superior health outcomes in one-party systems likely reflect
specific institutional features, such as bureaucratic continuity, long-term
planning capacity, and sustained health investment. These factors could
theoretically be achieved in other regime types with sufficient
institutional strength.
The quality of governance varied widely. Costa Rica led in Voice &
Accountability (61.74th percentile), while China and Cuba ranked among
the lowest (~5th percentile), indicating restricted civic space and limited
political freedoms. Rwanda and Costa Rica also performed well in
Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness, while Angola and
Kenya had weaker governance indicators. These patterns are consistent
with Nicholson et al. (2018), who argue that democratic governance
increases institutional legitimacy and public trust.
ANOVA results revealed significant differences between political
regimes. One-party systems (e.g., China) had higher total reserves ($589
billion vs. $44.8 billion in multiparty systems, p < 0.001) and GDP ($2.14
trillion vs. $300 billion, p < 0.001). In contrast, multiparty systems scored
higher on Voice & Accountability (39.54 vs. 5.96 per cent, p < 0.001) and
Rule of Law, supporting Fagbemi et al.’s (2021) contention that
democratization promotes transparency and accountability in
governance.
The results highlight a fundamental trade-off that reflects broader
theoretical debates in political economy. One-party systems exhibit
characteristics that align with state-led development theory. They
achieve superior economic and health performance through centralized
planning and policy coherence. However, this comes at the expense of
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
31
political freedoms and democratic accountability. Conversely,
multiparty systems validate democratic theory by enhancing
institutional legitimacy and transparency, though they may sacrifice
some efficiency for accountab ility. Hybrid or competitive authoritarian
systems, represented by dominant-party regimes, perform poorly on
most indicators, illustrating the institutional ambiguity that undermines
the efficiency of authoritarian systems and the legitimacy of democratic
ones.
These findings support Banik et al. (2023), who argue that
sustainable development goes beyond economic growth alone and
requires robust governance institutions. Accordingly, policymakers
should prioritize institutional reforms-in particular, improving anti-
corruption mechanisms and bureaucratic efficiency—rather than
focusing narrowly on foreign investment or growth targets. The long-
term dividends of good governance far outweigh the short-lived
benefits of authoritarian stability or unregulated capital inflows.
This study underscores the multidimensional nature of
development in the Global South, shaped by the intersecting dynamics
of economic performance, governance quality, and health outcomes.
While one-party systems may deliver economic and health dividends,
multiparty systems uphold the values of transparency and
accountability. The overarching conclusion is that institutional quality is
fundamental—without it, neither economic growth nor political
liberalization can ensure sustainable development. Future research
should examine the specific mechanisms through which governance
affects development, particularly in single-party systems, which appear
to be the most fragile across indicators.
Theoretical and Practical Implications and
Recommendations
This study provides critical insights into how different political
systems—one-party, multiparty, and dominant party regimes—shape
economic, governance, and health outcomes. It integrates theoretical
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
32
perspectives with real-world performance data and offers actionable
recommendations tailored to each system. While no regime type is
inherently superior across all dimensions, each has distinctive
advantages and vulnerabilities. By unpacking these characteristics, this
section offers pathways for system-specific reform and highlights cross-
cutting lessons to support sustainable development.
One-Party Systems
Theoretical Implications
The results challenge conventional democratic development
theory by showing that one-party systems can outperform in key areas,
particularly economic growth and public health outcomes. Centralized
authority allows for efficient resource mobilization, coordinated long-
term planning, and policy coherence without the delays often associated
with electoral competition. These findings support the argument that
state-led development models can be effective, especially in rapidly
transforming economies. However, this efficiency comes at the cost of
political freedoms and civic participation, raising long-term questions
about legitimacy, adaptability, and renewal of the social contract.
Practical Implications
One-party systems, as evidenced by China’s robust reserves of
$1.74 trillion and average GDP growth of 8.95%, demonstrate strong
capacity in economic management and public service delivery. Their
centralized health systems also contribute to commendable health
indicators, such as a life expectancy of 74.6 years. However, these
strengths are offset by governance weaknesses, including low Voice &
Accountability scores (e.g., 5.96 per cent), increased corruption risks due
to limited checks and balances, and potential stagnation in innovation
due to suppressed civic space and intellectual freedom.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
33
Recommendations
To ensure lasting legitimacy and avoid institutional stagnation,
one-party regimes should institutionalize accountability mechanisms,
such as independent audit bodies and robust anti-corruption agencies.
Carefully expanding civic space-through participatory budgeting, citizen
advisory councils, and localized forums-can provide controlled avenues
for citizen input without undermining political stability. In addition,
reducing state monopolies in non-strategic sectors could encourage
private-sector innovation and FDI diversification. Investment in human
capital, especially in education, digital literacy, and R&D, will be critical
to the transition to a knowledge-based economy and to maintaining
long-term competitiveness.
Multiparty Systems
Theoretical Implications
Multiparty systems validate core tenets of democratic theory by
promoting institutional legitimacy, government accountability, and
civic participation. These systems consistently score higher on
governance indicators such as Voice & Accountability (39.54 percentile)
and Rule of Law (34.52 percentile), reflecting broader participation and
institutional checks and balances. However, the analysis also highlights
a trade-off: despite their strengths in governance and public legitimacy,
multiparty democracies often lag behind one-party states in terms of
GDP growth and health service efficiency. This reveals an underlying
tension between democratic competition and administrative
coherence.
Practical Implications
The benefits of pluralistic governance—such as policy inclusiveness
and reduced elite capture—are often offset by practical challenges,
including policy inconsistency due to frequent electoral turnover,
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
34
sluggish implementation of long-term strategies, and moderate FDI
inflows. These weaknesses can impede development and create
governance volatility, particularly in fragmented political landscapes or
coalition governments.
Recommendations
To mitigate these challenges, multiparty systems should
institutionalize national development pacts that ensure policy
continuity across electoral cycles. Coalition governance can be
strengthened through technical assistance aimed at improving
legislative cooperation and coalition-building mechanisms. Public
administration reform is essential, particularly in depoliticizing civil
service recruitment and improving bureaucratic efficiency through
merit-based systems. In addition, streamlining FDI approval procedures
and establishing special economic zones can help attract and retain high
quality foreign investment without compromising regulatory oversight.
Dominant-Party Systems
Theoretical Implications
Dominant-party systems occupy a hybrid position between
authoritarianism and democracy. This study finds that they
underperform on both governance and development metrics,
supporting the theory that institutional ambiguity weakens both the
efficiency typical of authoritarian regimes and the legitimacy of
democratic systems. While these regimes attract higher levels of foreign
direct investment (4.85% of GDP), they perform poorly in controlling
corruption (25.23 percentile) and have lower average life expectancy
(55.45 years), suggesting systemic weaknesses in service delivery and
equitable development.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
35
Practical Implications
Although dominant-party regimes benefit from greater political
stability than fragmented democracies, they are prone to elite capture,
weak opposition, and policy stagnation. The lack of robust political
competition often undermines public trust and discourages innovation
in governance. Over time, the erosion of institutional independence and
political pluralism can degrade development outcomes and reduce
responsiveness to citizen needs.
Recommendations
To address these structural issues, dominant-party systems should
reform electoral frameworks to ensure fair competition and reduce
incumbent advantages. Strengthening independent institutions such as
anti-corruption commissions, electoral bodies, and the judiciary must
enhance political credibility and administrative fairness. Inclusive
governance can be fostered through mechanisms like citizen
assemblies, participatory budgeting at local levels, and multi-
stakeholder dialogues, which open space for diverse policy input.
Economically, these regimes should diversify their production base,
reduce overreliance on extractive industries and encourage investment
in manufacturing and technology to ensure resilience in the face of
commodity price shocks.
Cross-Cutting Recommendations for All Systems
While regime types differ in structure and ideology, common
lessons emerge that can be applied across all contexts. All systems must
align governance reforms with development goals such as those
outlined in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For example,
anti-corruption efforts, civil service improvements, and judicial
independence should directly contribute to better outcomes in health,
education, and infrastructure.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
36
Investing in data-driven policymaking is essential. National
statistical systems must be strengthened to provide accurate, timely,
and disaggregated data that support evidence-based decision-making
and enable governments to monitor performance effectively. Regional
peer learning should also be promoted through platforms like the
African Union or ASEAN, enabling countries to exchange insights on
best practices in areas such as healthcare delivery, FDI attraction, and
anti-corruption initiatives.
Finally, all regimes must strive to balance short-term growth with
long-term stability. Over-reliance on extractive industries or debt-
financed infrastructure may yield temporary gains but threatens fiscal
and institutional resilience. Instead, durable development requires
investment in human capital, sound institutions, and inclusive
governance mechanisms that adapt to changing societal needs.
Summary
No political system is universally superior, each carries distinct
trade-offs between efficiency, accountability, and inclusivity. However,
targeted reforms can harness the strengths and mitigate the
weaknesses of each regime type. One-party systems can maintain
economic momentum while cautiously expanding civic engagement.
Multiparty democracies should focus on enhancing policy coherence,
administrative professionalism, and stability. Dominant-party regimes
must clarify the rules of political competition and strengthen
institutional independence to avoid stagnation.
Ultimately, the key to sustainable development lies not in regime
type alone, but in the quality of institutions, the inclusiveness of
governance, and the adaptability of policy frameworks. Policymakers
must contextualize reform strategies to reflect national realities while
drawing from global lessons to build more resilient, responsive, and
equitable systems.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
37
Limitations and Future Research Directions
This study has several limitations that warrant consideration. First,
although the analysis identifies associations, the observational design
prevents definitive conclusions about how political regimes directly
influence development outcomes. Second, although necessary for
comparative analysis, the regime categorization simplifies complex
political realities, and variations exist within each category. For example,
there are differences between India’s vibrant federal democracy and
Malawi’s more fragile multiparty system. Third, the analysis may be
subject to omitting variable bias because historical, cultural, and
geographic factors not included in the models could influence both
regime persistence and development outcomes. Fourth, reliance on
World Bank governance indicators captures perceptions rather than
objective realities of governance quality.
Future research should address these limitations by taking a mixed-
methods approach that combines quantitative analysis with in-depth
case studies to uncover causal mechanisms. Longitudinal designs could
better capture how regime transitions affect development trajectories.
Research should also explore how variations in subnational governance
within different regime types influence local development outcomes.
Finally, more nuanced regime typologies that account for degrees of
authoritarianism and democratic quality would provide richer analytical
insights.
Conclusion
This study presents a comparative analysis of how governance and
political regimes affect economic and health outcomes in a diverse set
of emerging and developing countries. By examining the
interdependencies among GDP growth, life expectancy, and
governance indicators in one-party, multiparty, and dominant party
systems, the research confirms that the quality of governance is a key
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
38
determinant of development trajectories. One-party regimes
demonstrate the capacity for rapid economic gains and health
improvements, but often at the expense of civil liberties and long-term
adaptability. Multiparty systems maintain participatory governance and
transparency, but struggle with inconsistent policy implementation and
slower economic transitions. Dominant party regimes, while politically
stable and attractive to foreign investors, face entrenched governance
challenges that impede sustainable development.
The findings emphasize that effective development policy cannot
rely solely on economic expansion or regime type. Rather, it must
prioritize institution building, accountability, and citizen participation.
Importantly, institutional reforms do not require regime change;
improvements in bureaucratic effectiveness, anti-corruption
enforcement, and service delivery can be achieved within existing
political structures. This offers development practitioners a more
pragmatic pathway than calls for fundamental political transformation,
particularly in contexts where such transformation is politically
unrealistic. Recommendations that cut across different areas, such as
strengthening independent institutions, fostering regional peer
learning, and investing in data-driven policymaking, are essential to
addressing governance deficits and improving development outcomes.
Ethical Statement and Declaration
This study uses only publicly available, aggregated data from the
World Bank database. Since no human subjects were involved, no
ethical approval was required. The author declares no conflicts of
interest. AI-assisted tools were used for grammar checking and
language polishing in the preparation of this manuscript, but the
conceptualization, research design, data analysis, interpretation, and
scholarly argumentation are the original work of the author. All sources
are properly cited, and the research adheres to academic integrity
standards.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
39
References
Alwago, W. O. (2023). The nexus between health expenditure, life
expectancy, and economic growth: ARDL model analysis for
Kenya. Regional Science Policy & Practice, 15(5), 1064-1086.
https://doi.org/10.1111/rsp3.12588
Andrijevic, M., Crespo Cuaresma, J., Muttarak, R., & Schleussner,
C. F. (2020). Governance in socioeconomic pathways and its role for
future adaptive capacity. Nature Sustainability, 3(1), 35-41.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-019-0405-0
Apergis, N., & Payne, J. E. (2010). Renewable energy consumption
and growth in Eurasia. Energy economics, 32(6), 1392-1397.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2010.06.001
Ball, N. (2005). Strengthening democratic governance of the
security sector in conflict-affected countries. Public Administration and
Development: The International Journal of Management Research and
Practice, 25(1), 25-38. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.345
Banik, B., Roy, C. K., & Hossain, R. (2023). Healthcare expenditure,
good governance and human development. EconomiA, 24(1), 1-23.
https://doi.org/10.1108/ECON-06-2022-0072
Baz, K., Cheng, J., Xu, D., Abbas, K., Ali, I., Ali, H., & Fang, C. (2021).
Asymmetric impact of fossil fuel and renewable energy consumption on
economic growth: A nonlinear technique. Energy, 226, 120357.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2021.120357
Biyase, M., & Malesa, M. (2019). Life expectancy and economic
growth: Evidence from the Southern African development
community. Economia Internazionale/International Economics, 72(3),
351-366.
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
40
Bowler, S., Freebourn, J., Teten, P., Donovan, T., & Vowles, J.
(2023). Preferences for single-party versus multi-party
governments. Party Politics, 29(4), 755-765.
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/13540688221081783
Cervellati, M., & Sunde, U. (2011). Life expectancy and economic
growth: the role of the demographic transition. Journal of economic
growth, 16, 99-133. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10887-
011-9065-2
Claudio-Quiroga, G., Gil-Alana, L. A., & Maiza-Larrarte, A. (2022).
The impact of China’s FDI on economic growth: Evidence from Africa
with a long memory approach. Emerging Markets Finance and
Trade, 58(6), 1753-1770.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2021.1926233
Coveil, M. (2023). Stability and change in the Belgian party system.
In Parties and Party Systems in Liberal Democracies (pp. 105-129).
Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003430001-6
Darkwa, S. K. (2022). One-party rule and military dictatorship in
Africa. In Jerry John Rawlings: Leadership and Legacy: A Pan-African
Perspective (pp. 35-47). Cham: Springer International Publishing.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-14667-1_3
Fagbemi, F., Nzeribe, G. E., Osinubi, T. T., & Asongu, S. (2021).
Interconnections between governance and socioeconomic conditions:
Understanding the challenges in sub-Saharan Africa. Regional
Sustainability, 2(4), 337-348.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsus.2022.01.004
He, L., & Li, N. (2020). The linkages between life expectancy and
economic growth: some new evidence. Empirical Economics, 58(5), 2381-
2402. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00181-018-1612-7
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
41
Jamil Shah, M., Mehmood, T., & Hayat, A. (2019). Governance,
Economic Growth and Socioeconomic Development in
Pakistan. European Online Journal of Natural and Social Sciences:
Proceedings, 8(4 (s)), pp-20. https://european-
science.com/eojnss_proc/article/view/5953
Kekkonen, A., & Ylä-Anttila, T. (2021). Affective blocs:
Understanding affective polarization in multiparty systems. Electoral
Studies, 72, 102367. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102367
Kunze, L. (2014). Life expectancy and economic growth. Journal of
Macroeconomics, 39, 54-65.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2013.12.004
Levitt, R. E., Henisz, W., Scott, W. R., & Settel, D. (2010).
Governance challenges of infrastructure delivery: The case for socio-
economic governance approaches. In Construction Research Congress
2010: Innovation for Reshaping Construction Practice (pp. 757-767).
https://doi.org/10.1061/41109(373)76
Mukupa, G. M., Lungu, A., & Chibangula, S. (2016). An empirical
analysis of the determinants of economic growth in Zambia: 1973-
2013. World Journal of Research and Review, 2(5), 69-73.
Ndikumana, L. (2023). The Appropriateness or Inadequacy of the
Multi-Party System in Burundian Politics. Asian Research Journal of Arts
& Social Sciences, 20(4), 45-53.
https://doi.org/10.9734/arjass/2023/v20i4456
Ndlovu, D., & Haabazoka, L. (2024). Evaluating the Impact of
Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth in Zambia; 1996-
2020. East African Finance Journal, 3(1), 107-130.
https://doi.org/10.59413/eafj/v3.i1.5
TIEMPO & ECONOMÍA
Vol. 13 N.° 1 | Enero - Junio del 2026
42
Ngangue, N., & Manfred, K. (2015). The impact of life expectancy
on economic growth in developing countries. Asian Economic and
Financial Review, 5(4), 653.
https://doi.org/10.18488/journal.aefr/2015.5.4/102.4.653.660
Nicholson, S. P., Carman, C. J., Coe, C. M., Feeney, A., Fehér, B.,
Hayes, B. K., ... & Heit, E. (2018). The nature of party categories in two-
party and multiparty systems. Political Psychology, 39, 279-304.
https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12486
Rizvi, S. M. A. E. R. (2022). Three essays on conflict and economic
performance in fragile countries (Doctoral dissertation, Université
Clermont Auvergne). https://theses.hal.science/tel-04605014/
Shahbaz, M., Shafiullah, M., & Mahalik, M. K. (2019). The dynamics
of financial development, globalisation, economic growth and life
expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa. Australian Economic Papers, 58(4),
444-479. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8454.12163
Taylor, S. A. (2014). Fragile and conflict-affected states: exploring
the relationship between governance, instability and violence. Stability:
International Journal of Security and Development, 3(1), 28-28.
https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.dy
Yangailo, T. (2024). The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on
Economic Growth in Zambia: A Comprehensive Analysis. Revista
Científica Profundidad Construyendo Futuro, 21(21), 62-69.
https://doi.org/10.22463/24221783.4637
Zekarias, S. M. (2016). The impact of foreign direct investment
(FDI) on economic growth in Eastern Africa: Evidence from panel data
analysis. Applied Economics and Finance, 3(1), 145-160.
http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/aef.v3i1.1317