
Conflict mapping: Rwanda 1990-1994

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to propose a conflict mapping of the internationalized civil war in Rwanda. The events that led to the genocide of more than 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus will be analyzed by identifying the main factors that catalyzed the conflict. The historical context, the characterization of the primary and secondary actors, the dynamics of the conflict and the power relationship between the parties, the Arusha Peace Process, and, finally, the humanitarian implications as well as the international response will form the bases of the study. The paper reveals the failures of the international community to foresee the consequences of the policies implemented by the Rwandan regime and the incapability to act when the genocide took place.

Keywords: Rwanda, armed conflict, genocide, humanitarian crisis.

Resumen

El propósito de este artículo es hacer un mapeo del conflicto interno internacionalizado de Ruanda. Para este fin se abordan los eventos que condujeron al genocidio de más de 800.000 Tutsis y Hutus moderados en 1994. El contexto histórico, la descripción de los actores, las dinámicas del conflicto, las relaciones de poder entre las partes, el proceso de paz de Arusha, las implicaciones humanitarias y la respuesta de la comunidad internacional, son los factores clave para el análisis del caso propuesto. El artículo revela los intentos fallidos de la comunidad internacional para prevenir el desenlace de las políticas implementadas por el régimen de Ruanda y para actuar a tiempo una vez desencadenado el genocidio.

Palabras clave: Ruanda, conflicto armado, genocidio, crisis humanitaria

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Introduction

Although the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi armed opposition group, was created in the late eighties, the armed conflict in Rwanda actually began in October 1990, when this group launched an invasion attempt on Rwanda from its base in Uganda, with the purpose of overthrowing the Hutu regime in that country. Since then both parties (the RPF and the Rwandan government) got involved in a dynamic of deadly violence interrupted by intervals of peace negotiations sponsored by the international community which lasted only until April 1994, when the death of Rwandan president Juvenal Habyrimana became the starting signal for a genocide campaign which ended three months later, and after more than 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus had been killed, with the military victory of the RPF. In this context, the purpose of this paper is to propose a conflict mapping of the internationalized civil war in Rwanda for which, first of all, a brief historical context highlighting both the structural and proximate causes of the armed conflict is presented; secondly, a characterization of the primary and secondary actors, emphasizing their positions, interests, behavior and attitudes is explored; third, an analysis of the dynamics of the conflict and the power relationship between the parties is proposed; fourth, a critical overview of the Arusha Peace Process is outlined, and; finally, the humanitarian implications of the conflict as well as the international response to them are analyzed.

1. Historical context: structural and proximate causes of the Rwandan armed conflict¹

1.1. Socio-political and cultural background causes: social vulnerabilities in the edge of war

1.1.1. Ethnicity and identities: Hutu vs. Tutsi?

The Rwandan case has been usually portrayed as an ethnic conflict, in which a Tutsi minority (10-14% of the total population) was oppressed and discriminated by a large Hutu majority (85-90%) which benefited from the control of the State apparatus and thus violently opposed any attempt to change the political status quo. In this context, the creation of the RPF by the Rwandan Tutsi diaspora living in neighboring Uganda can be seen as an almost automatic response to a history of systematic ethnic oppression, discrimination and exclusion (as illustrated, for example, by the rigid quota system applied to the Tutsis to access education or State jobs). The violent government reaction to the RPF's claims and threat can also be understood if history is taken into account: until the 1959

1 For this section Thomas Ohlson's analytical division of the causes of war, or of the "reasons" to go to war, between background (or structural) and proximate reasons (or triggering factors) was used. See: Thomas Ohlson, 2008, «Understanding Causes of War and Peace», in *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 14 (1), pp. 136-138.

Hutu Revolution (that ended in Rwanda's independence in 1962) it was the Tutsi minority who controlled the State and the Hutu majority who suffered the discrimination. In fact, Rwanda seems to prove Collier's finding that in countries with such a sharp ethnic composition the risk of conflict doubles.² Nonetheless, in the case of Rwanda there has been a significant debate about the nature of the ethnic divisions between those who see the ethnic divide as a real, historical (pre-colonial) and racial one and those for whom the ethnic divisions are just a social construction created and exacerbated for political purposes (both during the colonial period and afterwards). Without entering into this debate, it is important to mention that there is no evidence of significant ethnic violence in Rwanda's pre-colonial history,³ which means that the strong communal identities that are a precondition for protracted social conflict seemed to be part of the colonial legacy and the Belgian application of the "divide and rule" principle.⁴

1.1.2. Colonial legacy: the hardening of ethnic identities

In this sense, even though the ethnic division between Hutus and Tutsis existed before the Belgian colonial rule, it seems to be that then this separation was flexible enough to be perceived as legitimate, reflecting more a socioeconomic division than a racial one (with Hutus being peasants and Tutsis cattle owners);⁵ thus, there were not yet strong, absolute and conflicting group identities of the type "we" against "them". It was with the colonial rule that the Hutu-Tutsi identities were intentionally institutionalized, becoming rigid and exclusive as a way to facilitate the colonial rule by using and strengthening what were perceived as local political institutions.⁶ Since then the Tutsi minority, which was considered by the Belgians as a superior ethnic group, acquired the right to rule (exploit and discriminate) the majority of "inferior" Hutu population as long as this served the colonial power. This situation lasted until the mid 1950s when in the process of decolonization the Belgians switched sides and supported the Hutu,⁷ which passed from being the oppressed to being the oppressors (a process which resulted in hundreds of thousands of Tutsis leaving Rwanda and becoming refugees in neighboring countries).

As Utterwulge rightfully points out, in the Rwandan case for both ethnic groups "... the 'past', be it-pre-colonial or colonial, mythologized or based on real experiences, often

2 See: Paul Collier, 2000, «Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy», World Bank, p. 7, source: ReliefWeb, date: 15 March 2008, at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/civilconflict.pdf>.

3 See: Christopher Clapham, 1998, «Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking», in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 35, N° 2, p. 197.

4 See: Oliver Ramsbotham et al., 2006, *Contemporary conflict resolution. the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*, Cambridge, Polity Press, pp. 85-86

5 See: Peter Uvin, 1999, «Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence», in *Comparative Politics*, vol. 31, N° 3, p. 254.

6 See: Helen Hintjens, 1999, «Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda», in: *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 37, N° 2, pp. 250

7 See: René Lemarchand, 1995, «Rwanda: The rationality of genocide», in *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, vol. 23, N° 2 p. 8

refers to a history of inequality, discrimination, persecution, and, in the extreme, massacre. This is interpreted as a threat to one's own or the group identity and, correspondingly, the group will be deeply affected by fear...".⁸ Therefore, the Hutu-Tutsi conflicting ethnic identities developed during the colonial period created a cultural and subjective context prone to violence, characterized by a distrust and fear of "the other"; a context which was easily exploited by conflict entrepreneurs and by spoilers of the peace attempts. Nonetheless, strong ethnic identities do not produce violence for themselves in an automatic way as is proven by the fact that "... ethnicity was not really an item on the agenda in the years before the outbreak of civil war in 1990".⁹ For ethnic identities to become violent they have to be transformed into mobilizing racial ideologies as happened in Rwanda, especially once the armed conflict had already started (a factor which explains its genocidal intensity). But this is only possible if there are also other structural and triggering factors that combined with the ethnic divide create an explosive context.

1.1.3. Horizontal inequalities and the instrumentalization of the State

Due to the hardening of a hierarchical social and political structure built on ethnic lines in the colonial period and the authoritarian character of the Rwandan government (with president Habyarimana being in office since his military coup in 1973), the high level of inequality that characterizes most African countries took the shape of an horizontal inequality in Rwanda.¹⁰ This meant that one ethnic group (in this case the Tutsis) felt excluded from the social, political and economic opportunities which, according to the research on the causes of armed conflict imply a type of inequality that can "escalate into violent attack on the state".¹¹ This might have been the case of the Tutsi RPF, especially given that the Hutu oligarchic elite (as had been also the case with the Tutsi elite in the past) perceived the control of the State as a way to access and maintain economic privileges and political power usually at the expense of the concerns and needs of "the other". Thus, such an instrumentalization of the State's structure might have increased what Ohlson calls the legitimacy gap in both its vertical and horizontal dimensions

8 See: Steve Utterwulghé, 1999, «Rwanda's Protracted Social Conflict: Considering the Subjective Perspective in Conflict Resolution Strategies», in *OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, issue 2.3., source: The Tabula Rasa Institute, date: 2th March 2008, at: http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/p2_3utter.htm.

9 Regine Andersen, 2000, «How multilateral development assistance triggered the conflict in Rwanda», in *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 21, N° 3, p. 443.

10 This does not mean that the vertical inequality (income distribution among individuals) was not significant in the years previous to the Rwandan armed conflict. In this sense, it is worth to mention that between 1985 and 2000 Rwanda evolved from being a low inequality country (Gini of 0.289) to a high inequality one (Gini of 0.451). This deterioration might have increased the levels of poverty which in a country with a significant youth bulge such as Rwanda is a strong predictor of armed violence. See: An Ansoms, 2005, «Resurrection after Civil War and Genocide: Growth, Poverty and Inequality in Post-conflict Rwanda», in *The European Journal of Development Research*, vol. 17, N° 3, p. 502.

11 See: Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, 2007, «Rethinking the Policy Objectives of Development Aid: From Economic Growth to Conflict Prevention», Research Paper N° 2007/32, United Nations University / World Institute for Development Economics Research, p. 4.

(perceived legitimacy of the authority and of the relationship with other groups),¹² being this a strong predictor of armed conflict. Even if it is true that in Rwanda “... the dividing line between the haves and the have-nots was regional and social, not ethnic” and that the legitimacy gap was stronger within the Hutu majority,¹³ it is also true that the government itself tried to portray the social and economic conflict as an ethnic one with the intention of undermining and delegitimizing the growing intra Hutu opposition.¹⁴ For this purpose it positioned the RPF as an “external Tutsi enemy” that was supposed to be threatening the wellbeing of all Hutus.

1.1.4. The Rwandan diaspora: proper ground for the creation of the RPF

According to Collier the size of a country’s diaspora as well as its political activism are factors that increase the probability of a civil war,¹⁵ which seems to be the case of Rwanda, whose refugee population in neighboring countries (mainly Tutsis who fled the country after the 1959 Hutu Revolution) was about 700.000 by 1990.¹⁶ In Uganda, where the RPF was created and from where it launched its guerrilla war against the Rwandan Hutu government, approximately one million residents were of Rwandan origin by 1993 (many of which were refugees or refugees’ children).¹⁷ The harsh conditions suffered by Rwandans in exile and their difficulties to integrate in their hosting societies (whether Uganda, Tanzania or Burundi)¹⁸ is probably an explanatory factor of their maintenance of a strong sense of national identity and of their organization and politicization (one of the central issues of their agenda being the right to return to their homeland).

1.1.5. Scarce resources and population growth

Rwanda is a very small landlocked country (26,338 sq km¹⁹) with an economy based on subsistence agriculture. In this context, not only Rwanda’s heavy dependency on primary export commodities²⁰ was a significant risk factor for armed conflict,²¹ but the

12 See: Thomas Ohlson, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

13 Peter Uvin, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

14 Other authors such as Lemarchand highlight the regional dimension of the socioeconomic and political intra Hutu conflict in Rwanda which was more important than the ethnic dimension before the invasion of the RPF, since with president Habyarimana’s military coup the power shifted from southern to northern Hutus. See: René Lemarchand, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

15 See: Paul Collier, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

16 See: Regine Andersen, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 443.

17 See: Charles Smith David, 1995, «The Geopolitics of Rwandan Resettlement: Uganda and Tanzania», in *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, vol. 23, N° 2, p. 54.

18 See: Cyrus Reed, 1995, «The Rwandan Patriotic Front: Politics and Development in Rwanda», in *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, vol. 23, N° 2, p. 49.

19 See: «Rwanda», source: *CIA World Factbook*, date: 16th March 2008, at: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html>.

20 Rwanda’s economy depends heavily on coffee production, which accounted for 82% of the country’s export earnings in 1986. See: Regine Andersen, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 447

21 See: Paul Collier, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

fact that land was a scarce resource in a poor agricultural society, combined with a high population growth (with Rwanda having the highest population density in Africa), created an explosive combination. In the years previous to the war the increased population/land ratio, encouraged by the Government and the Catholic's Church opposition to family planning, meant that soon "Many families had little land to earn a living and feed their children".²² Although it cannot be said that "Malthusian" pressures automatically produce violent conflict they certainly create an environment prone to it, because of their exacerbation of socioeconomic, political and ethnic tensions.²³ In this context of overpopulation, the fact that the return of the Tutsi refugees was a central issue in the RPF agenda created a profound *incompatibility* with the Hutu government, which claimed that that was not possible because Rwanda was already overpopulated.

1.1.6. Unstable regional environment: the spillover effect of endless wars

In the years previous to the armed conflict in Rwanda almost²⁴ all of its neighbors were engaged in armed conflicts, a factor that would make any country more vulnerable to an outbreak of war²⁵ because of the spillover effect and the easy access to arms, trained combatants and safe havens that an unstable regional context produces; this being especially relevant in a mountainous landlocked country such as Rwanda with almost inexistent infrastructure connecting the different regions, thus the perfect setting for a guerrilla war. This is without mentioning the interests that neighboring countries might have had in aiding the parties to the conflict, with Uganda, for example, allegedly aiding the RPF while Zaire (South Africa and France) did the same with the Rwandan government.

1.2. Proximate causes

1.2.1. Economic crisis

In the years previous to the Rwandan armed conflict not only land pressure was growing steady but it was accompanied by severe droughts in 1989-1990 and 1993, and increasing environmental degradation and food shortages due to diseases in basic crops²⁶ (factors which constituted all serious *physical vulnerabilities*). To make things

22 See: Cec lle Meijer and Philipp Verwimp, 2005, «The Use and Perception of Weapons before and after Conflict: Evidence from Rwanda», Small Arms Survey Working Paper 2, p. 12.

23 See: Elihu Richter *et al.* 2007, «Malthusian Pressures, Genocide, and Ecocide», in: *International Journal of Occupational and Environmental Health*, vol. 13, N  3, p. 331.

24 The exception was Tanzania, but nonetheless this country got "embroiled in conflicts in neighbouring countries". See: «Tanzania», source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, date: 16th March 2008, at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=153®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa.

25 See: Ted Gurr *et al.*, 2005, «Forecasting Instability: Are Ethnic Wars and Muslim Countries Different?», copyright by the American Political Science Association, pp. 3, source: Center for Global Policy, George Mason University, date: 16th March 2008, at: <http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/PITFethnicmuslim.pdf>.

26 See: Regine Andersen, 2000, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-448.

worse, Rwanda's dependency on coffee proved to be its curse when the international prices of this product collapsed the year before the outbreak of war, so that the country's "export earnings plummet by 50% between 1987 and 1991. Its external debt doubled between 1985 and 1989..." and the peasants' income decreased by approximate 20%.²⁷ This grave economic situation deteriorated the legitimacy gap and increased the social, political and ethnic tensions, especially since the government was not able and willing to respond to the population's basic needs (being more concerned with increasing its military expenditure). At the same time, and as an automatic but insensitive response to the economic crisis (that did not take into account all the above mentioned *early warning signs* that made of Rwanda an explosive site), the 1990 Structural Adjustment Program of the IMF and the World Bank based on the liberalization of the economy, produced a 40% devaluation of the Rwandan franc and an increasing inflation.²⁸ The economic crisis was then one of the main triggering factors for the conflict since, as Ansoms has noted, "Frustrated poor peasants not only killed for ethno-politico-ideological reasons; they were also driven by the possibility of increasing their wealth and acquiring the property of their victims".²⁹

1.2.2. Forced democratization: growing domestic opposition and the weakening of the government

As was also the case in many other countries after the end of the Cold War, the donor countries of Rwanda conditioned their development cooperation to the establishment of a multi-party democracy, which was seen (and is still seen) by many western countries as a "magic formula" to achieve peace and development.³⁰ This external ideological pressure to liberalize the political system, in a context of economic crisis and growing social and ethnic tensions, had the undesired effect of further weakening the government and strengthening the recently created Hutu extremist parties, which used the "democratic" space opened by the international pressure to preach anti-democratic practices, fear and ethnic violence.³¹ The fact that Habyarimana's already delegitimized regime was further weakened by the political liberalization caused it to feel threatened by the growing intra-Hutu opposition that this process created and thus encouraged it to exacerbate the anti-Tutsi ethnic discourse with the purpose of re-gaining national (Hutu) unity in the face of a perceived external Tutsi enemy. In this context, the RPF invasion fit perfectly to Habyarimana's regime urgent need to re-legitimize itself, projecting an image of being the

27 *Ibid*, p. 448.

28 See: *Ibid*, p. 448.

29 An Ansoms, 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 503.

30 It is interesting to see, for example, that in neighboring Burundi the democratization process was also accompanied by an intra-state conflict with the new radical political parties challenging the established regime. See: «Burundi», source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, date: 16th March 2008, at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=26®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa.

31 See: Peter Uvin, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

legitimate representative of the Hutu majority, challenged by an external enemy and its domestic allies (meaning with this all moderate Hutus).

2. Parties to the conflict: government *vs.* rebels³²

The *primary parties* to the armed conflict in Rwanda were the Government of the country (headed by President Juvénal Habyarimana) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel (mainly Tutsi) organization which launched a guerrilla war against Habyarimana's regime in October 1990. The conflict ended, after a series of failed peace negotiations and cease fires with the RPF military victory of July 1994, thus the *time period* for this analysis is from October 1990 to July 1994.

By the time the conflict began in 1990 the Rwandan government had been under the control of President Habyarimana and his Hutu political party (Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Développement or MRND) for 27 years. Nonetheless, this oligarchic regime was facing a serious legitimacy crisis as a result of both the increasing international and domestic pressure to democratize the political system and as result of the socioeconomic instability that was affecting the whole country. In this context, and in the face of the RPF invasion, the government struggled to position itself as the legitimate representative of the Hutu majority and its protector against what it perceived as a Tutsi threat (including in this category both RPF and the moderate Hutus), which, according to it, pretended to take over power to reinstall its oppressive colonial rule.³³

The *issue*, as defined by the government, was thus about stopping an external threat to Rwanda and protecting the Hutu majority from being enslaved by the Tutsi minority as happened before the Hutu Revolution. According to the Hutu regime ethnicity was therefore the central point of the incompatibility, which made it a nonnegotiable *generalized issue*. However, it is worth noting that the government's ethnic discourse was not a new phenomenon: ethnic prejudices had been raised in the past every time the government felt threatened.³⁴ In this sense, beyond ethnicity, the most important issue for Habyarimana's regime, the interest implicit in its racist discourse, was to remain in power and maintain the social, political and economic privileges of being the governing elite. Then, the *incompatibility* defined from a non-partisan perspective was the control of the State's apparatus and the privileges that it implied, for which the governing elite needed to portrayed itself as the defender of national (Hutu) unity, equating the growing intra-Hutu opposition to the RPF and thus delegitimizing it. The elite insecurity produced both by the democratization process and by the RPF invasion, led it to mobilize the population and to encourage violent behavior in order to protect its own power and privileges.³⁵ According to Jones, "... predatory

32 See Annex II and III.

33 See: René Lemarchand, 1995, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

34 See: Peter Uvin, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

35 See: Regine Andersen, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

elites with broad 'security' fears constructed a narrow security dilemma at the mass level, to support their hostile opposition to peace".³⁶

In this context, the *attitude* of the regime (its perception of the "other") consisted in the demonization of all Tutsis, considering them to be of foreign origin (exploiting the myth of the Tutsis having come from Ethiopia centuries ago) and thus not a part of the national community but a threat to it,³⁷ represented by the RPF. The demonization consisted also in the development of a conspiracy theory according to which the RPF and its Hutu allies wanted to re-establish Tutsi hegemony in Rwanda and its neighboring countries (using widespread violence against the Hutus to change the ethnic balance of the region).³⁸ As a consequence, the governing elite rapidly developed a racist attitude that dehumanized the Tutsis and moderate Hutus who were portrayed as cockroaches that needed to be exterminated for the well being of the majority. This attitude allowed the Hutu regime to blame the Tutsis as a group for the economic crisis, the political instability and all other problems of the country in such a way that Tutsis became a useful scapegoat for the government's failure and decadence.³⁹

Violence was presented by the Hutu leadership as the only possible preventive *behavior* for the Hutu population due to the alleged Tutsi intention to enslave it and oppress it. Therefore, apart from its counterinsurgency campaign against the RPF, the governing elite invested significant amount of resources in training extremist militias (i.e. Interahamwe) and distributing weapons among the Hutu population, preparing in this way the grounds for the genocide campaign that took place in April 1994 with the aim of exterminating the "Tutsi threat" and its Hutu supporters. There were also selective killings and massacres perpetrated by State's agents (the Presidential Guard, for example) or by militias closed to the regime with the intention of spreading fear among the population in order to give credibility to its ethnic discourse and also with the aim of sabotaging any possible negotiated solution to the conflict that would imply losing its privileged position. In the weeks following the RPF invasion attempt, for example, about 500 to 1000 Tutsis were massacred in Rwanda.⁴⁰

However, all this might not have been possible without the regime's resource to hate propaganda (especially through the radio station Radio Libre des Milles Collines) which was fundamental for the creation and generalization of the perception of Tutsis as an imminent threat to the Hutus wellbeing. In this context, the other non-violent behavior, the engagement in peace talks sponsored by the international community, was just a facade to maintain foreign recognition and support while preparing for a full scale war and a geno-

36 Bruce D. Jones, 1997, «Keeping the Peace, Losing the War: Military Intervention in Rwanda's "Two Wars"», Institute for War and Peace Studies, source: Columbia International Affairs Online, date: 12 March, at: <http://www.ciaonet.org.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/conf/iwp01/iwp01ac.html>.

37 See: René Lemarchand, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

38 See: Helen Hintjens, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

39 See: *Ibid.*, p. 256.

40 See: Regine Andersen, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

cide campaign. Compromise and power sharing were not considered as real possibilities by the Hutu regime.

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), for its part, was a politico-military organization created in 1988 in Uganda by Rwandans refugees (or their sons) that had fled from Rwanda in the early sixties after the Hutu Revolution. It presented itself as a nationalist force and not as the armed branch of an ethnic minority;⁴¹ in this sense, although it was mainly composed of Tutsis it did not have an ethnic agenda and among their high rank commanders there were both Tutsis and Hutus.⁴² The *incompatibility*, as defined by the RPF was thus about political power and the control of the State, which it saw as being controlled by a corrupt and oppressive dictatorship in the hands of a decadent oligarchy, and thus portrayed itself as the liberator of all Rwandans.⁴³ In the case of the RPF the perceived incompatible issues were of a specific nature, ranging from the right of all refugees to return to Rwanda to claims for “national unity, democracy, and end to corruption and nepotism, a self-sustaining economy, improved social services, a national military, a progressive foreign policy, and an end to the system which generates refugees”.⁴⁴ Thus, both from the party perspective and from a non-partisan viewpoint the main incompatibility was that the RPF pretended to change the current regime and acquire full control of it or at least guarantee itself a significant political participation in a new democratic Rwandan government. Beneath the RPF’s demands lied a strong need for respect and recognition of full citizenship rights to the Rwandan’s in exile and to the Tutsi minority in the country.

The RPF’s perception of the Hutu regime was that the Rwandan government was a weak, illegitimate, corrupt and violent regime that did not represent the Rwandans, and that due to its weakness could be defeated through military means. This perception of the government as a decadent regime coupled with its confident self image as a strong, disciplined and righteous army led the RPF to develop both a hostile attitude towards the Hutu regime and a strong position in the peace process that took place in 1993. Nonetheless, the RPF’s attitude towards the moderate Hutus within the government was one of compromise, since its leaders believed that the moderate Hutus understood the political situation and thus that it might be possible and even desirable to make peace with them. This was also due to the acknowledgement of the RPF’s leadership of its narrow base of popular support which would make a military victory difficult to sustain politically (since it might be portrayed by the Hutu elite as a return to an unwanted Tutsi feudal rule) and thus the only real option for it would be to participate in peace negotiations and accept a power sharing arrangement.⁴⁵

41 See: *Ibid.*, p. 200.

42 See: Roméo Dallaire, 2003, *Shake hands with the devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. Canada, Random House, pp. 65-66.

43 See: René Lemarchand, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

44 Cyrus Reed, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

45 See: Christopher Clapham, 1998, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

In this context, the RPF's *violent behavior* consisted in a highly effective guerrilla war that forced the government to sustain peace dialogues and created the context needed by the opposition parties to strengthen their position and become part of the coalition government that negotiated with the RPF. On the other hand, its *non-violent behavior* consisted in a decision to engage in peace talks with the coalition government, respect the cease-fire and accept a power sharing arrangement sponsored by the international community.

Besides the primary parties to the conflict there were two *secondary parties* that need to be mentioned. First of all, France, which played a key role in supporting Habyarimana's government both politically and militarily. As soon as the RPF launched its invasion attempt in October 1990 Habyarimana's regime invoked an old military cooperation agreement with France and as a response this country rapidly deployed troops and military advisers in Kigali to protect the Hutu government. A factor that might have been decisive in halting the RPF's advance towards that city at the end of 1990, thus averting what would have been an imminent defeat for the government and therefore prolonging the armed conflict. Even more controversial was the U.N. sanctioned French "humanitarian" intervention in 1994 (known as *Opération Turquoise*) which was presented as a response to the genocide designed to create a humanitarian protection zone in the south part of the country but which had the "collateral" effect of protecting the perpetrators and the officials of the former regime in their flight to Zaire (again averting a complete military defeat of the Hutu regime).⁴⁶ The French involvement in Rwanda can be explained as a result of the personal relationship between the presidents of both countries and therefore the French interest in maintaining a friendly regime in Rwanda, but especially as a result of the French perception that protecting the Hutu government was also a defense of African *francophonie* (or the French cultural legacy in Africa), threatened by the English speaking RPF and its Anglo-Saxon allies.⁴⁷

Secondly, although it always denied it, Uganda did its part in giving military and logistical support to the RPF,⁴⁸ both because its government sympathized with the RPF commanders (some of which had fought on the side of President Museveni in the recent Ugandan civil war that ousted former dictator Milton Obote) and also because it saw in the RPF a way of extending its political influence in the region.

3. Conflict dynamics: power relations and phases

3.1. Power relations

Although the Rwandan case could be easily portrayed as an asymmetric conflict in the sense that it was a struggle between an established government and a rebel group or

46 See: Bruce D. Jones, 1997, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

47 See: Christopher Clapham, 1998, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

48 See: Bruce D. Jones, 1997, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

between a Hutu majority versus a Tutsi minority,⁴⁹ the truth is that several factors in the power relations between the primary parties *neutralized the asymmetry* and even turned it in favor of the RPF. For example, even if the government's armed forces, its gendarmerie and the presidential guard outnumbered the 4,000 force of the RPF during the whole conflict (with just the army increasing its size from 7,000 men in 1989 to 30,000 in 1994)⁵⁰ this numerical asymmetry was neutralized by asymmetries of organization, method, will (or morale), and political support that favored the rebel group.⁵¹ While the RPF, for example, was a well trained, well disciplined and well supplied force whose soldiers and commanders had extensive training and combat experience from their participation in the Ugandan civil war, the government's forces could not be more than the military projection of the weak, corrupt and bankrupted government they defended: they were "disorganized and disoriented".⁵² According to Unamir's Force Commander, with the exception of the elite units, the army was "...composed of poorly trained recruits who lacked weapons, food, medical supplies and, above all, leadership and morale".⁵³ The case of the Gendarmerie was even worst, being an undisciplined body whose composition "...ranged from true professional police officers to out-and-out criminals in uniform".⁵⁴ French support might have temporarily leveled the situation but it could not be sustained in the face of a government sponsored genocidal campaign.

In the same sense, the RPF's will and morale was extremely high both because it considered itself to be fighting for a righteous cause and because it was confident that it could reproduce the outcome of the Ugandan civil war in Rwanda: "If the NRM could liberate Uganda, the RPF began to ask why it could not do the same in Rwanda".⁵⁵ For this purpose it not only had the advantage of its previous experience in Uganda but also the fact that Rwanda's difficult geography favored its military strategy (or method): guerrilla warfare. The situation for the government's forces was the opposite; their will and morale were extremely low: defending a decadent oligarchy which lacked popular legitimacy was not very attractive. This fact might have triggered the governing elite's launching of a propaganda campaign focused on spreading fear about the "Tutsi threat" with the intention of uniting the nation against an "external enemy" and raising the will and morale of its forces and supporters. The 1994 genocide will be the tragic outcome of this behavior.

Finally, even though the government tried to position itself as the representative of the Hutu population it did not really have the political support of the majority of Rwandans.

49 See: Oliver Ramsbotham, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

50 See: Helen Hintjens, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

51 For an explanation of the different forms and dimensions of asymmetry between conflicting parties, see: Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson, 2001, «Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts», pp. 6-11, source: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, date: 29th March 2008, at: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB223.pdf>.

52 See: Bruce D. Jones, 1997, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

53 Roméo Dallaire, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 70.

55 See: Cyrus Reed, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

The grave socioeconomic crisis and the externally sponsored democratization process eroded the government's popular support and created a strong intra-Hutu opposition. As a consequence the government was constrained and received pressures both from inside (by the newly created opposition parties) and outside the country (by the international community and the RPF); a process that took place in a deteriorated socioeconomic context that narrowed the government's base of popular support (and which it tried to revert through its ethnic propaganda). On the other hand, although the RPF's base of political support in Rwanda was not strong, its awareness of the government's weakness motivated it to launch its offensive in 1990.⁵⁶ At the same time with its attitude of compromise towards the moderate Hutus (which it saw as potential allies in its conflict with Habyarimana's government) and with its nationalist and non-ethnic discourse, it intended to broaden its domestic base of support. At the international level, while only receiving support from Uganda, the RPF wisely exploited the international pressure against the government to democratize the political system and negotiate with its opponents to its advantage, transforming this external pressure to the government in political space for itself (thus strengthening its negotiating position).

3.2. Phases to the conflict and escalation/de-escalation dynamics

Despite the fact that the Rwandan armed conflict between the Hutu government and the RPF lasted for only four years, during this period it's possible to identify three main *phases* determined by significant changes in the *composition* of one of the parties (the government in this case), which had clear implications for the behavior of the parties and thus the escalation and de-escalation dynamics. The first phase lasted between 1990 and 1992 when Habyarimana's party (the MRND, which by the time was the only legal political organization) had a complete control of the State's apparatus. The government's behavior was mainly a counter insurgency campaign responding to the RPF's guerrilla warfare, thus this first phase was characterized by an *escalation* of the armed conflict.

A second phase began in March 1992 when as a result of both external and internal pressures a democratization process was undertaken and a coalition government composed by the MRND and the main Hutu opposition parties assumed the responsibility of ruling the country.⁵⁷ Since then, the parties that composed the government could be divided between moderates and extremists (which were also known as "Hutu Power"), creating a complicated and unstable political landscape that made it difficult to determine who the real power holders were. This was especially true due to the fact that many of the Hutu Power factions (such as the *Akuza*, a small group of radicals closed to the president or the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique, a racist anti-Tutsi party) decided not to participate in the coalition government and in the peace negotiations that

56 See: Regine Andersen, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

57 See: Bruce D. Jones, 1997, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

followed with the RPF.⁵⁸ The complex and conflicting dynamic that developed within the government between the extremists and the moderate Hutus ended finally with almost a complete elimination of the latter in April 1994. In this process, President Habyarimana lost the support of the Hutu Power factions, the support of the international community (which conditioned its aid to the progress of the peace process and thus gradually suspended it) and finally his life,⁵⁹ when his plane was shot down in April 6th 1994, a breaking point that marked the transition to the third and last phase of the conflict.

In this context, during the second phase the contradictions within the government were reflected in its behavior, characterized by a simultaneous engagement in peace talks with the RPF (favored by the moderates) and by the training and arming of extremist militias and the spreading of anti-Tutsi propaganda, favored by the Hutu Power politicians who radically opposed any compromise with the RPF. In fact, according to Clapham, the opposition parties conditioned their participation in the coalition government to the beginning of peace negotiations with the RPF, and then used "... the leverage provided by the RPF in order to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis the MRND...".⁶⁰ This apparent contradictory behavior within the government allowed the Hutu extremists to use the negotiation process as a tactic of peace in the framework of a strategy of war and genocide, where compromise was never conceived as possible. The RPF, for its part, both because it thought it could advance its interests through a negotiated settlement but also as a result of foreign pressure, adopted in this phase a behavior favorable to compromise and thus engaged in the Arusha Peace Process sponsored by the international community. In sum, the second phase of the conflict from 1992 to April 1994 was characterized by a *de-escalation dynamic* encouraged by a ceasefire and the launching of peace talks, interrupted only by isolated events of violence and by the RPF's offensive of February 1993 with which it showed its military strength by doubling the territory under its control in just two days and forced the regime to move forward in the signing of a peace agreement favorable to its interests.⁶¹ This dynamic led to the signing of the Arusha Peace Accord on the 4th of August 1993, a comprehensive agreement that was never implemented because of the resumption of hostilities in early April 1994.

The third phase from April 6th to July 19th 1994, that began with the assassination of president Habyarimana (probably by Hutu extremists which opposed the implementation of Arusha), was characterized by an escalation of the armed conflict and by a genocide campaign against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus. This phase, and with it the Rwandan armed conflict between the Hutu regime and the RPF, ended three months later with the military victory of the rebel group, after which it became the official government of the country (although the RPF took control of the capital on the 4th of July it only got

58 See: Christopher Clapham, 1998, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

59 See: Regine Andersen, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 451.

60 Christopher Clapham, 1998, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 204.

controlled of the whole country by the 19th of July, which was also when the new government was sworn in).⁶² Right after Habyarimana's death the Presidential Guard and extremist Hutu militias launched a campaign to exterminate moderate Hutu politicians⁶³ (getting rid of almost all the Hutu moderates within the coalition government in the first forty eight hours) which then extended into a general extermination campaign against all Tutsis. This process meant the collapse of the coalition government and a temporary and shadowed coup d'état by the Hutu Power factions which triggered a quick and successful resumption of the military offensive by the RPF. Its offensive ended both the genocide and the vestiges of the Hutu regime, whose leaders fled Rwanda to neighboring countries alongside two million Hutu refugees. Nonetheless, before the end of the conflict by mid 1994 more than 800,000 Rwandans had been killed by the Hutu extremists.

4. Settlement proposal: the Arusha peace agreement

Apart from Uganda and France that intervened as secondary partisan actors, there were also early *third party mediation* attempts from both Tanzania (where most of the negotiations leading to the Arusha Agreement took place) and from the Organization of African Unity (OAU).⁶⁴ These third parties played an active role from the beginning of the conflict when they favored cease-fire declarations and made available to the primary parties their scarce resources to launch military observer and monitoring missions (which were actually deployed since late 1991). However, these early missions were ill prepared and equipped and thus "... appear to have done nothing to contribute to the search for a negotiated end to the Rwandan civil war".⁶⁵ Once the peace process was signed the U.N. acquired a significant role through the deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (Unamir) in October 1993, whose mandate was to help the parties implement Arusha's dispositions. In the field Unamir assumed a role of mediator *de facto* between the parties, trying hard to move forward and protect the implementation of the peace agreement.

Although the third party mediators did not have adequate resources of their own to press the parties to accept their peace initiatives, they had at their side a significant amount of pressure from donor countries, the World Bank and the IMF who conditioned their development cooperation and loans (desperately needed by a country with a severe socioeconomic crisis and completely dependent of foreign aid) to the democratization of the political system and to the progress in the peace process. It was in this context that

62 See: «Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR)», source: Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, date: 12th March 2008, at: http://www8.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/JDIC/JTIC/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwit0531.htm@current&pageSelected=&keyword=fdlr&backPath=http://jtic.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/JDIC/JTIC&Prod_Name=JWIT&activeNav=http://www8.janes.com.ezproxy6.ndu.edu/JDIC/JTIC.

63 See: René Lemarchand, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

64 «Rwanda», source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, date: 29th March 2008, at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/gp-country.php?id=133®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#.

65 See: Bruce D. Jones, 1997, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

the Arusha *settlement proposal* was put forward by the external mediators. Basically, it provided for a change of the *conflict structure* by including in the political system as legitimate players all actors that had been excluded in the past (both the Hutu opposition parties and the RPF) through the creation of a Broad-Based Transitional Government and other power-sharing arrangements. These mechanisms constituted an example of *conflict management* since they pretended to put an end to the violent behavior of the conflicting parties but postponed the resolution of the issues that caused the conflict (both the background and proximate causes of the war discussed in the first section of this paper were left untouched by the peace agreement). As Utterwulghe points out, “Arusha was essentially a strategic solution of containment with limited vision”.⁶⁶ It was expected that the issues that originated the conflict would be solved by the Transitional Government in an almost automatic way through the newly established democratic channels, unfortunately the war broke out again before these mechanisms were put in place.

Apart from the Transitional Government disposition, the Arusha Peace Agreement foresaw multiparty general elections, a complete reform of the security sector so as to allow for the integration of the RPF in the Army (in a position of equality with the Hutu forces), the recognition of the refugees’ right to return to Rwanda, and the deployment of a neutral international force to oversee the implementation of the Agreement.⁶⁷

Although on paper the Arusha peace process seemed to be a well suited *compromised* power sharing arrangement between the primary parties that would change their behavior from violence to cooperation, it had many shortcomings that finally made it unsustainable and impossible to implement. First of all, the Arusha Peace Agreement followed a standardized western model of conflict resolution applied in many armed conflicts after the end of the Cold War that did not take into account the particularities of the Rwandan case. According to this ‘magic’ and lineal formula of peacemaking imposed to the Hutu government and the RPF by external actors (based on western liberal values), a cease fire would be followed by the creation of a transitional coalition government which would then call for general elections and the making of a new constitution, with the guaranteeing presence of a peacekeeping operation.⁶⁸ The end result, according to the theory, could not be other than long lasting peace. As a result of this way of thinking important factors were disregarded. For example, the will of the parties to actually implement the agreement was taken for granted (which in the case of the Hutu Power factions did not exist at all), and the fact that the conflict was not ripened for resolution was completely ignored. In this context, “That any settlement ultimately emerged was a tribute to the demands of international mediators to achieve an ‘agreement’—a piece of paper to which all parties involved could be persuaded to put their signatures—”.⁶⁹

66 Steve Utterwulghe, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

67 See: «Rwanda», source: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, date: 29th March 2008, at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdata-base/gpcountry.php?id=133®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#.

68 See: Christopher Clapham, 1998, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-196.

69 *Ibid.*, p. 204.

Secondly, the external pressures to sign a peace agreement right from the beginning of the conflict did not take into account that not every time is proper for a negotiated solution and that only when the conflict is ripe such a solution might be possible.⁷⁰ In the Rwandan case, by the time the negotiations began there was neither a mutually hurting stalemate (since the RPF had the military capability to defeat the government) nor an acknowledgement by the Hutu extremists of the fact that they were in a disadvantaged position and would not be able to maintain their power and privileges. As a result, Arusha was used as a façade by the Hutu extremists, who exploited the time provided by the process to prepare their genocidal campaign.⁷¹

Third, the Hutu extremists excluded themselves from the peace process in such a way that the RPF ended up negotiating the agreement with representatives of the Hutu opposition and moderate parties who were now part of the coalition government but who did not represent the real power holders (those with military power and control of territory such as the Akuzas, the CDR, the Interahamwe militias or other Hutu Power groups).⁷² As a result, the agreement never had a real chance of being implemented. This auto exclusion from the peace process of powerful Hutu Power factions might not have been a problem if the international community had the resolve to consider them as spoilers and thus act accordingly, being ready to use force if necessary to enforce the agreement (for which it would have been necessary a strong peace enforcement mission instead of the weak peace-keeping operation that was actually deployed). But this was not the case in Rwanda.

Fourth, the rigid agreement forced upon the parties did not make peace attractive at all to the members of the former regime, which would have been a minimum precondition for any peace settlement to be sustainable⁷³ or at least implementable. As a result of Arusha they would not only lose their power and privileges but since the opposition was to control the ministries of Justice and Interior they could also be processed for crimes committed in the past. This closed the window for the implementation of the agreement and pushed the already radical Hutus to even more desperate and extremist positions and behavior. According to Unamir's force commander, among other measures, an amnesty to the members of the former regime might have provided a better ground for sustainable peace,⁷⁴ making the negotiated agreement at least a little bit attractive to the former all powerful Hutu elite.

Finally, Arusha was an example of an elite peacemaking process which did not take into account the attitudes, behaviors, interests, needs and fears of a general population that had been already mobilized by the elites in a context of widespread violence, distrust

70 Ripeness can be achieved through a mutually hurting stalemate or through the mutual acknowledgement of the possible outcome if the conflict continues See: Thomas Ohlson, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

71 See: Helen Hintjens, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

72 See: Christopher Clapham, 1998, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-204.

73 See: Thomas Ohlson, 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

74 See: Roméo Dallaire, 2003, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138.

and fear. Especially lacking from the agreement were, for example, the concerns of civil society groups and among them women issues. In this sense, even if it had been implemented, the Arusha Agreement might not have been sustainable unless accompanied by grassroots peacemaking initiatives.

5. Humanitarian emergency and the international response: *the failure of humanity*⁷⁵

As a consequence of the armed conflict but especially as a consequence of the genocide campaign of April 1994 a serious humanitarian crisis developed in Rwanda, in the face of which, mostly because of political reasons, the international community failed to protect the hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and moderate Hutus that were massacred or forced to leave their households to seek refuge in safer areas within Rwanda or in neighboring countries. In this process, two million Rwandans left the country while one more million became internally displaced.⁷⁶ This, in a country with the size of Rwanda, meant that about 5 to 10% of the country's population was killed in less than three months,⁷⁷ that about 70% of all Rwandan Tutsis were exterminated and that half of the population was displaced.⁷⁸ The political, economic and environmental impact of these large populations' movements was soon felt not only within Rwanda but also in the neighboring countries that received refugees: increasing insecurity with the presence of armed criminals and genocide perpetrators in the refugee camps, deforestation and depletion of water resources, food insecurity, disease outbreaks, etc.⁷⁹ It still remains a challenge how to prevent history to repeat itself, this time with a Tutsi government being challenged by Hutu refugees in neighboring countries.

As a result, the Rwandan conflict not only left a negative *physical impact*, evidenced by the collapse of the economic production, a State apparatus falling apart and incapable of fulfilling its minimum social responsibilities, and the destruction of vital public infrastructure, but also left a deep *social scar* with the violent disruption of social fabric and the generalization of hates and fears that after more than ten years of the end of the war are still an obstacle for guaranteeing a durable and positive peace. It is important to mention that although most of the killed during the conflict and the genocide were men,⁸⁰ women

75 "The failure of Humanity" is a suggestive phrase which is part of the title of General Roméo Dallaire's book on his experience in Rwanda as Force Commander of Unamir. See: Roméo Dallaire, 2003, *op. cit.*

76 See: «April 1994 and its aftermath». Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (1996). Source: ReliefWeb, date: 29th March 2008, at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/nordic/book1/pb020g.html>.

77 See: Helen Hintjens, 1999, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

78 See: Laurel Rose, 2004, «Women's Land Access in Post-Conflict Rwanda: Bridging the gap between customary law and pending law legislation», in *Texas Journal of Women and the Law*, vol. 13, p. 200

79 See: Charles Smith David, 1995, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

80 This fact had a serious gender impact in post-conflict Rwanda, since women had to assume roles traditionally done by men with significant legal and customary constraints to do it (i.e. access to education, property rights, etc.).

were also deliberately targeted, sexual violence being a systematic and brutal means of warfare that affected more than 200,000 Rwandan women and girls, with approximately 5000 children born as the result of rape.⁸¹ Children were also a vulnerable group during the conflict, with both parties using child soldiers.⁸²

Faced by this humanitarian catastrophe the response of the international community proved to be completely inadequate to protect the lives of thousands of Rwandans being deliberately victimized. This was the result of political considerations, Rwanda being an African country in which none of the major powers had national interests and with the U.N. being reluctant and hesitant to intervene after its embarrassing performance in Somalia. As a consequence, for example, because it was not willing to send troops or commit resources to a country where it did not have 'vital national interests', the Clinton administration refused to call the situation in Rwanda as a genocide even when it had accurate information of what was going on in the field. This led to this country's aggressive opposition to giving Unamir the resources and mandate that it needed to halt the genocide. The U.N. bureaucracy, for its part, was more concerned with protecting the institutional image after the failure of Somalia and the difficulties in the Balkans than with helping Rwanda, to the extreme that the Security "Council and the Secretariat (...) concluded that the needs of the U.N. overrode the needs of those who were the targets of the genocide".⁸³ In this context, once the Arusha Peace Agreement collapsed and the genocide began, instead of reinforcing Unamir to halt and reverse the humanitarian tragedy (changing its mandate from Chapter VI to Chapter VII and increasing its resources) the U.N. Security Council decided to reduce its presence in the country leaving only a skeleton force of less than 500 personnel.⁸⁴ These impotent peacekeepers were forced to watch the genocide without being able to do much to halt the humanitarian disaster that unfolded. Unamir's decision to leave the country "forced the withdrawal of almost all humanitarian agencies from the areas controlled by the interim government" because of security reasons (which constituted a *targeting problem*).⁸⁵ Those humanitarian actors which decided to stay, such as the ICRC, Caritas or the WFP did it with a high risk to their own security, due to the chaotic environment in which they had to work and the complete indifference and lack of support from the international community. Thus, the inadequate and almost inexistent humanitarian response during the conflict and the genocide and the impressive and self proclaimed

81 See: Michael Hopps, 2000, «Aftermath: Women and Women's Organizations In Postgenocide Rwanda», *USAID Evaluation Highlights*, N° 69.

82 See: Roméo Dallaire, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

83 Michael Barnett, 1997, «The U.N. Security Council, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda», in *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 12(4), p. 562.

84 See: Mats Berdal, 2005, «The United Nations, Peacebuilding, and the Genocide in Rwanda», in *Global Governance*, vol. 11, p. 119.

85 «The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience», Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* (1996), source: Relief-Web, date: 29th March 2008, at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/nordic/book3/pb0221.html>.

successful humanitarian assistance⁸⁶ that took place after the war was over, are perfect examples of humanitarian action serving as the substitute of political, diplomatic and military actions of the international community needed to prevent and halt humanitarian tragedies.⁸⁷ In sum, in Rwanda the international humanitarian response was late and inadequate and when finally arrived once there were not significant security threats to its personnel, it focused its resources on helping Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries, which given the fact that Hutu Power factions had control of many of the refugee camps, created a serious threat to the humanitarian principles. The refugees needed the assistance, but at the same time the RPF (now government of the country) questioned the impartiality of the aid being given to the ‘wrongdoers’ and not to the now legitimate authority of the country.⁸⁸ The *target groups* chosen by the humanitarian actors might have also had the unexpected negative effect of providing valuable resources to the perpetrators of the genocide who were camouflaged among the victims, thus prolonging the instability of the region and maintaining the door open for the return of war.

Annex I. Rwanda



Source: *Military Periscope*.⁸⁹

86 See: «CIDA's International Humanitarian Assistance: Great Lakes Region of Africa», source: Canadian International Development Agency, date: 29 March 2008, at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/EMA-218131520-PF8#3>.

87 See: «The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience», *op. cit.*

88 See: Christopher Clapham, 1998, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

89 «Rwanda», source: Military Periscope, date: 30 March 2008, at: <http://www.militaryperiscope.com.ezproxi6.ndu.edu/nations/africa/rwanda/organzn/index.html>.

Annex II. Positions, interests and needs of the primary parties

	Rwandan Patriotic Front	Rwandan Government
Positions (subjectively defined incompatibilities)	The RPF is a nationalist force (not the armed branch of an ethnic minority) which is fighting against a corrupt and oppressive dictatorship with the purpose of liberating all Rwandans. The issue was thus about political power and the control of the State.	The government is the legitimate representative of the Hutu majority and it is protecting Rwanda against the Tutsi threat (including both RPF and moderate Hutus), which pretends to take over power to reinstall its oppressive colonial rule. The issue was thus about stopping an external threat to Rwanda and protecting the Hutu majority from being enslaved by the Tutsi minority as happened before the Hutu Revolution. According to the Hutu regime ethnicity was therefore a central point of the incompatibility.
	A democratic and legitimate government must be established, corruption and nepotism have to end. Political and economic reforms are urgently needed in Rwanda.	
	All refugees should be granted the right to return to Rwanda and become full citizens.	The return of the refugees is not possible due to the country's overpopulation. There are not refugees anymore since they resettled in neighboring countries.
Interests (non-party defined incompatibilities)	Change the current regime and acquire full control or at least a significant political participation in a new democratic Rwandan government.	Remain in power and maintain the social, political and economic privileges of being the governing elite.
		Maintain national (Hutu) unity, equalizing the intra-Hutu opposition to the RPF.
	Government control	
Needs	Respect, full citizenship, recognition.	Elite security.

Annex III. The primary parties' attitudes and behaviors

	Rwandan Patriotic Front	Rwandan Government	
		Hutu Power	Moderate Hutu (Hutu opposition parties)
Behavior	The Rwandan government is a weak, illegitimate, corrupt and violent regime that does not represent the Rwandans.	Demonization of all Tutsis, considering them to be of foreign origin (hamites from Ethiopia) and thus not a part of the national community but a threat to it. The demonization consisted also in the development of a conspiracy theory according to which the RPF and its Hutu allies wanted to establish Tutsi hegemony in Rwanda and its neighboring countries. The governing elite thus developed a racist attitude.	Habyarimana's regime is a decadent and oligarchic dictatorship that needs to be changed by a democratic and pluralist government representing all sectors of society.
	If necessary Habyarimana's regime can be defeated through military means. It is a decadent regime.	The Tutsis and moderate Hutus were also dehumanized when portrayed as cockroaches that needed to be exterminated for the well being of the majority.	The RPF is a politico-military organization representing the Rwandan exiles. Since they have a legitimate political agenda their concerns must be taken into account.
	The moderate Hutus understand the political situation and thus it might be possible to make peace with them.	The governing elite blamed the Tutsis as a group of both the economic crisis and the political instability. Tutsis became a useful scapegoat for the government's failure and decadence.	Peace talks with the RPF are the only way out to the conflict and are also a mean to increasing the opposition's share in a future Rwandan government.

(behavior)	Violent behavior		
	Guerrilla war	Counterinsurgency warfare.	Counterinsurgency warfare.
		Training of extremist militias (i.e. Interahamwe) and distribution of weapons among the Hutu population.	
		Selective killings and massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.	
		Genocide (complete extermination of the Tutsi threat and its Hutu supporters).	
Non-violent behavior			
Compromise: Decision to engage in peace talks, respect the ceasefire and accept a power sharing arrangement sponsored by the international community.	<p>Hate propaganda (especially through radio stations) spreading fear and a perception of Tutsis as an imminent threat to the Hutus wellbeing.</p> <p>Engagement in peace talks as a facade to maintain foreign recognition and support while preparing for a full scale war and genocide campaign. Compromise and power sharing was not considered as a real possibility.</p>	Compromise: Decision to engage in peace talks and accept a power sharing arrangement. Perception of the conflict and the peace talks as a way to further weaken Habyarimana's regime and increase its participation in a future government.	

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